

Current History

MAY, 1962

FOR READING TODAY . . . FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

DISARMAMENT AND COEXISTENCE

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Current History

Founded in 1914 by
The New York Times

Published by
Current History, Inc.

Editor, 1943-1955:
D. G. REDMOND

MAY, 1962
Volume 42 Number 249

Publisher:
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Canada \$7.75 a year. Foreign in-
cluding the Philippines \$8.25 a year.

Coming Next Month...

UNITED STATES TRADE IN PERSPECTIVE

June, 1962

In the summer of 1962, CURRENT HISTORY will devote three issues to a problem of growing importance: what foreign trade policy should the United States government adopt? The June, 1962, issue offers an historical survey of United States trade and tariff policies. Seven articles will cover the following periods:

TRADE IN COLONIAL AMERICA by *George Langdon*, Instructor in History, Yale University;

TRADE AND TARIFFS, 1789-1829 by *Broadus Mitchell*, Visiting Professor of Economics, University of Puerto Rico, and author of "Alexander Hamilton: Youth to Maturity 1755-1788";

TRADE AND TARIFFS, 1830-1865 by *William G. Carleton*, Professor of Political Science, University of Florida, and author of "The Revolution in American Foreign Policy";

TRADE AND TARIFFS, 1866-1919 by *Theodore Saloutos*, Professor of History, University of California, and author of "Farmer Movements in the South, 1865-1933";

TRADE AND TARIFFS, 1920-1932 by *Victor L. Albjerg*, Professor of History, Purdue University, and author of "Europe since 1939";

TRADE AND TARIFFS, 1933-1945 by *Robert Burke*, Associate Professor of History, University of Washington, and author of "Olson's New Deal for California"; and

TRADE AND TARIFFS, 1945-1961 by *William Diebold*, Director of Economic Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, and author of "The Schuman Plan."

ALSO COMING . . .

WORLD TRADE AND NATIONAL TARIFFS,
July, 1962

UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY, 1962,
August, 1962

HIGH SCHOOL DEBATERS: Please note these three issues on the 1962-1963 N.U.E.A. DEBATE TOPIC: What should be the foreign trade policy of the U.S.?

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Entered as second class matter May 12, 1943, at the post office at Philadelphia, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, 1962, by Current History, Inc.

There can be no meaningful disarmament until political tensions are relaxed; at the same time, a measure of arms control may help to relax political tensions. In this issue, eight specialists explore the twin problems of disarmament and coexistence: the history of disarmament negotiations, the political tensions that accelerate the arms race, the practicability of deterrence, the differing Russian and American views of practical arms control. Two introductory articles focus on the question: What can we learn from the futile negotiations of the past 17 years?

The Disarmament Deadlock: 1946-1955

By BERNHARD G. BECHHOEFER

*Consultant, Division of International Affairs of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission*

ON JUNE 14, 1946, Bernard Baruch, America's elder statesman, addressed a solemn warning to the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission:

My Fellow Members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and my Fellow Citizens of the World, We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. That is our business. Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. Let us not deceive ourselves. We must elect World Peace or World Destruction.¹

This address opened the years of discussions of disarmament in the United Nations and in the commissions and committees created by or affiliated with the United Nations, discussions which still continue.

When the charter of the United Nations was signed in June, 1945, it was never con-

templated that the subject of disarmament would assume such a dominant role in the United Nations during the early years of its existence. The charter, like the covenant of the League of Nations, rested on the premise that the scourge of war had become so terrible that steps had to be taken to control and ultimately to reduce national armaments. The League covenant, however, had looked to disarmament as one of the first principal steps toward peace. In contrast, the United Nations uses the word disarmament only twice.²

The principal powers engaged in the struggle against Germany deliberately sought to avoid the fruitless negotiations for disarmament which had taken place under the auspices of the League of Nations during almost the entire period between the first and second World Wars. The United Nations Charter, therefore, placed emphasis upon the establishment first of an effective system of collective security as a prelude to any attempt to limit the armaments of the great powers. In fact, Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt had

¹ U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, *The International Control of Atomic Energy, The First Report to the Security Council*, Dept. of State Publication 2737 (Dec. 31, 1946), Appendix 1, p. 81.

² Article 11, 47. U.S. Dept. of State, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, Publication 2368 (1945).

contemplated disarming all countries except the "Big Three" and with some reservations, France.

Almost immediately after the signing of the Charter in San Francisco in August, 1945, the explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima introduced a new element into international relations which altered the thinking of all countries. The frightening magnification of destructive capability immediately brought to the fore the entire problem of the regulation of armaments. The United States took the initiative in urging immediate action in the direction of international control of atomic energy. Within a few days after Hiroshima, President Truman devoted an entire speech to the international consequences of nuclear weapons.

The atomic bomb is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world. That is why Great Britain and the United States, who have the secret of its production, do not intend to reveal the secret until means have been found to control the bomb so as to protect ourselves and the rest of the world from the danger of total destruction. . . . We must constitute ourselves trustees of this new force to prevent its misuse, and to turn it into the channels of service to mankind.³

President Truman proceeded to consult with the British and Canadian Prime Ministers and Stalin and on December 27, 1945, a Soviet-Anglo-American communiqué, popularly known as the Moscow Declaration, revealed that the three powers "agreed to recommend, for the consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the establishment by the United Nations of a commission to consider problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters."⁴ The Security Council and General Assembly in January, 1946, unanimously established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission consisting of the members of the Security Council and, in addition, Canada when that state was not a member of the Security Council. Bernard Baruch was appointed United States representative on

this Commission in March, 1946, and at its first meeting introduced into the Commission an outline of the United States plan for the control of atomic energy which from that date on became known as the Baruch Plan.

In October, 1946, when the General Assembly reconvened, the Soviet Union, without any consultation and as a complete surprise to the Western powers, took the initiative in putting before the United Nations the problem of the reduction of conventional armaments.⁵ Whether the Soviet initiative can be regarded merely as a propaganda effort or as a broader approach to the entire armaments problem, the effect was to place before the United Nations at this early date the entire problem of control and reduction of all types of armed forces and armaments. The problem has remained before the United Nations ever since.

Even at this early stage, another event transpired which vitally affected all of the negotiations, the rapid demobilization of all of the Western armed forces immediately after World War II. This ran completely contrary to the dictum of President Roosevelt that in the post-war period "the real decisions should be made by the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China, who would be the powers for many years to come that would have to police the world."⁶ Thus, the concept of the "Four Policemen" which was so related to the plans for dealing with regulation of armaments had vanished within a short time after the armistice. We now know as a matter of hindsight the direct relationship between the military weakness of the West in the years immediately following the armistice and the intransigence of the Soviet Union.

For the purposes of this article, it is convenient to divide the ten years of negotiations commencing in 1946 into three periods. The first period may be described as the period of the Baruch Atomic Energy Plan beginning with the first General Assembly of the United Nations in January, 1946, and lasting through the final Soviet rejection of this plan in the fall of 1948. The second period which may be described as the period of complete futility lasted from the fall of 1948 until the creation of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in the fall of 1951. The third

³ U.S. Department of State, *The International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy*, Publications 2702 (1946), p. 108. Cited hereafter as *Growth of a Policy*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

⁵ United Nations Document A/Bur/42, *USSR: Draft Proposal* (October 29, 1946).

⁶ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (1948), p. 717.

period which may be described as the period of the comprehensive disarmament approach extended from the creation of the United Nations Disarmament Commission until United States "reservation" of all previous positions in August 1955,⁷ the terminal point of this article.

The First Three Years

From 1946 until the fall of 1948 the disarmament negotiations in the United Nations proceeded simultaneously in two separate commissions: the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

The discussions in the Atomic Energy Commission were based upon the Baruch Plan and the Soviet counter proposals. The central thought of the Baruch Plan was its provision for international control of the entire process of producing atomic weapons from the uranium and plutonium mines to the completed weapons.⁸ This depended upon complete accountability for all materials capable of nuclear fission from mines to weapons. In 1946, complete accountability appeared to be a realizable objective. Only the United States and the United Kingdom had a knowledge of the technique of producing fission materials and weapons. It was recognized, however, that this monopoly would not last and the Soviet Union in five years or less would probably likewise be able to produce weapons. This to a certain extent accounted for the urgency and speed of the original negotiations.

In 1946, the United States believed that uranium was a scarce material and that the United States itself could purchase all uranium that might be produced anywhere in the world. Gigantic plants and tremendous expenditure were deemed essential to separate the fissionable U-235 from natural uranium as at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, or to produce plutonium as at Hanford, Washington. Indeed, a scientific committee of the United

Nations Atomic Energy Commission after a study unanimously agreed that affective control through complete accountability was technically feasible. For the first and almost last time during these discussions the Soviet Union reached the same conclusion as the United States.

The second basic feature of the Baruch Plan was to promote the use of atomic energy "for peaceful and humanitarian ends."⁹ Obviously, there would be no divergence between the Soviet Union and the West on this objective. The Soviet Union had much more to gain than the West from a policy of making available to the entire world the possible benefits of the technologies of nuclear fission.

At the second meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission on June 19, 1946, only five days after the first presentation of the Baruch Plan, Andrei Gromyko presented the Soviet Plan which called for an international convention to prohibit immediately "the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy."¹⁰ Even this early, the basic difference between the Soviet and the Western approach made its appearance. Gromyko was calling for immediate prohibition of weapons and destruction of stockpiles with no international control machinery to insure the observance of commitments. Baruch was calling for the immediate establishment of complete control machinery with the prohibition of nuclear weapons and elimination of nuclear stockpiles taking place only at a later date after the establishment of the international control system.

Initially, Gromyko rejected all controls, contending that they were not reconcilable with the principle of sovereignty of states. In October, however, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, modified the initial position to recognize in theory the need for international controls, and in June, 1947, after a year of negotiations, the Soviet Union finally presented its proposal for controls,¹¹ which proved entirely inadequate.

During 1946 and 1947, the discussions of the Baruch and Soviet proposals were precise and detailed and might easily have led to an impasse on the sole ground that the Soviet Union refused to permit sufficient penetration of its Iron Curtain to permit the West to be reasonably certain that the Soviet

⁷ U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission, *Third Report*, Annex 5, Doc. DC/SC.1/41 (March 27, 1956), pp. 26–27.

⁸ *Growth of a Policy*, op. cit., pp. 49–50.

⁹ "The Three-Nation Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy," November 15, 1945, *ibid.*, p. 118.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

¹¹ U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, *The International Control of Atomic Energy*, The Second Report to the Security Council, Dept. of State Publication 2932 (December, 1947), p. 88.

Union was observing its commitments. Indeed, this issue was squarely joined in a discussion on August 11, 1947. The Chinese representative asked what would happen if after the prohibition of nuclear weapons, no agreement was reached on the control system. Gromyko replied, "If there is found to be no basis for agreement, then naturally the convention [on controls] cannot be concluded."¹²

This argumentation might readily have convinced world opinion that the impasse in the atomic energy negotiations arose entirely from Soviet unwillingness to breach its Iron Curtain. Unfortunately, other issues intervened which muddled the waters and permitted the Soviet Union to reject the Baruch Plan for the wrong reasons. The most important of these issues related to the great power veto in the international control organ responsible for regulation of atomic energy. Baruch had originally asserted with vehemence that no state should have the right of a veto in the control organ. Ultimately the Soviet Union accepted this idea but insisted that the control organ could go little farther than to determine a violation and notify the United Nations Security Council. Any steps to punish the violator would have to be taken in the Security Council where the Soviet Union had a veto.

Baruch, however, insisted that all of the great powers by treaty give up their veto on atomic matters in the Security Council. The United States had always recognized that a major violation of the Atomic Energy Convention by a great power such as the Soviet Union would mean world war. Under such circumstances it would make little difference whether the United Nations Security Council acted or failed to act since the United Nations lacked the military strength to wage a major war. The United States emphasis on the veto tended to obscure the main and fundamental divergence between the Soviet position and that of the West.

A second factor muddying the waters was the United States absence of a position on the phasing and timing of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The United States' statements were sufficiently vague so that the So-

viet Union could logically conclude that the elimination of nuclear weapons would not take place in whole or in part until complete establishment of the control organ in all areas of the world and the transfer to the control organ of all installations dealing with nuclear energy. The Soviet Union could contend that at that late date, when it was no longer possible for nations to re-establish their sovereignty, the United States might refuse to go ahead with its commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons.

As a result of these and other issues tending to obscure the basic difference, many individuals like Henry Wallace in the United States sought to find a middle position between the Baruch and Soviet proposals. For many years, they believed that a compromise position giving security to both East and West might have been achieved. In retrospect, it seems clear that in these latter years of Stalin it would have been impossible for the Soviet Union to agree to any substantial breach of its Iron Curtain. It had been impossible for the Soviet Union to respond favorably to the Marshall Plan which offered economic aid without any strings attached to it to rehabilitate all of Europe, including the Soviet Union. If the minimum amount of cooperation required for an agreement on Marshall Plan aid was impossible, the vast cooperation required for successful implementation of the Baruch Plan would have been out of the question.

During this period, the Soviet Union was moving as rapidly as possible to develop its own nuclear weapons. It had no intention of serious negotiations at least until it could improve its negotiating position through developing its own nuclear capability. However, the negotiations on the Baruch Plan were detailed and precise and could easily have resulted in a treaty if any substantive agreement had been reached. This situation did not reappear in the disarmament negotiations for more than 10 years.

In contrast, the discussions in the Commission for Conventional Armaments never went beyond the stage of pure propaganda. The Soviet Union in all of its discussions concentrated on a demand for a one-third reduction of all armaments and armed forces. At the same time the Soviet Union resisted any efforts to establish the figures from which

¹² U.S. Department of State, *The International Control of Atomic Energy: Policy at the Crossroads*, Publication 3161 (1948), p. 154. Cited hereafter as *Policy at the Crossroads*.

the one-third reduction would take place. Furthermore, in view of the admitted superiority of the Soviet bloc in conventional armaments, the effect of any such reduction even if faithfully observed would have widened the strategic imbalance already favoring the Soviet Union.

While the Western Powers pointed out effectively both in the Commission for Conventional Armaments and in the United Nations General Assembly the inadequacy of the Soviet proposals, their own proposals were of little consequence. The West was taking the position that proposals for reductions in conventional armaments could be put into effect only in an atmosphere of international confidence and security; and that the international control of atomic energy (i.e., acceptance of the Baruch Plan) together with other conditions, such as possible settlements with Germany and Japan, were essential to the establishment of such an atmosphere of confidence and security. This created the strange result that under the United States proposals atomic energy could be controlled and atomic weapons eliminated without an improvement in the international atmosphere but that reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces had to wait for an improvement in international affairs. Thus, the West would give up the one weapon where it had superiority before it would even discuss reduction of the weapons where the Soviet Union had superiority.

The illogical and anomalous position stemmed basically from confusion in the higher echelons of the United States government. Such thinking, however, as in the case of the atomic energy negotiations, prevented the emergence of the one clear-cut issue of all the negotiations: whether the Soviet Union would permit sufficient breach of its Iron Curtain to give a reasonable assurance to the world that it was observing its own commitments.

Serious negotiations to control atomic energy came to an end in the fall of 1948 when the United Nations General Assembly, despite the opposition of the Soviet Union, approved a part of the Baruch Plan which thus became the "United Nations Plan" and thereafter was so described by the Western Powers but not by the Soviet bloc.

The final report of the United Nations

Atomic Energy Commission had also recommended suspension of the negotiations. The General Assembly, however, did not go along with this portion of the recommendations, and suggested further negotiations. This was the first but not the last occasion when the smaller states declined to accept the verdict of the Great Powers that negotiations had reached an impasse and should be abandoned; it showed the universal concern that channels of negotiation remain open.

The United Nations approval by an overwhelming vote of the Baruch Plan over Soviet opposition was a futile act with importance only in the field of propaganda. In the existing state of world power, it is basic that any arms control agreement in order to be effective must have the approval both of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Complete Futility

The period from the fall of 1948 until the fall of 1951 can best be characterized by the term "complete futility." Each year the United Nations General Assembly and subsidiary groups debated the subject of disarmament, but there was no progress toward agreement. After 1949, the few meetings on atomic energy were purely pro forma. In the field of conventional armaments, the only substantive action in 1949 was the approval of a French paper calling for a census and verification of armed forces and armaments.

In the spring of 1950, the Soviet Union withdrew both from the Atomic Energy Commission and from the Conventional Arms Commission because of the failure of these Commissions to seat a representative of Communist China. In the summer of 1950, the United States perhaps taking advantage of the absence of the Soviet Union from these meetings, introduced into the Commission for Conventional Armaments preliminary studies made within the United States government on certain phases of disarmament. These studies as well as the French proposal for census and verification represented an extremely preliminary and tentative approach. The census and verification proposal provided merely for a one-time operation. One of the United States papers—on industrial safeguards—was only a half page in length,

In effect, from 1948 to 1951 there was a complete stalemate in all United Nations negotiations on arms control. The important developments took place outside the United Nations where the Soviet Union embarked on two intense campaigns of propaganda. The first was the so-called Stockholm appeal¹³ a petition circulated all over the world with millions of signatures—the message of which can be summarized by the phrase “Ban the Bomb.” The second, which reached its climax in 1952, was the campaign to prove that the United States troops had used bacteriological warfare in Korea. The relation of this second campaign to arms control was logically somewhat remote. The Soviet Union called for a General Assembly recommendation for a convention prohibiting bacteriological and chemical warfare without safeguards to ensure the observance of the convention. This would furnish a precedent for a similar recommendation in connection with atomic warfare.

As these campaigns developed in intensity, it became increasingly clear that the object of the Soviet Union in all the negotiations was to secure, if possible, the unilateral disarmament of the West. The United Nations discussions would merely be one propaganda vehicle to effectuate that objective. Both of the major Soviet propaganda campaigns called for disarmament without safeguards—which could be the equivalent of the unilateral disarmament of the West. The propaganda slogans were linked to other features of the Communist party line: such as, liquidating overseas bases and bringing the boys home. Simultaneously the Soviet Union was extending the Iron Curtain to Hungary and Czechoslovakia and trying to bring Greece, Berlin and South Korea within the Communist orbit.

This blatant propaganda approach boomeranged against the Soviet Union in the United Nations. All members of the United Nations except the Soviet bloc opposed all Soviet proposals and the delegates expressed their disgust and displeasure at the Soviet attitudes. Outside the United Nations the propaganda campaigns, while initially stirring up a certain amount of emotional senti-

ment, lost their appeal after the Communist attack on South Korea. Unfortunately, during this period while the Soviet Union was using disarmament negotiations solely as a propaganda vehicle, the Western powers had no program at all, except the Baruch Plan, a situation prevailing until the General Assembly of 1951.

Comprehensive Disarmament

In the United Nations General Assembly of 1950, President Truman had suggested that it might be useful to consolidate the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and create a single disarmament commission. The time was ripe for such a change. It was inconceivable that the United States would eliminate nuclear weapons where it had superiority without some action to correct the strategic imbalance favoring the Soviet Union in conventional weapons. Any agreement for arms control would involve both nuclear and conventional weapons and therefore it was appropriate for a single body to treat both problems.

In addition to combining the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments negotiations, the Western proposals in 1951 signalled several major changes in substantive position. The West had abandoned its earlier insistence that disarmament negotiations (excepting in the field of atomic energy) could not go forward until an improvement in the general political situation. It was recognized that agreement on disarmament would lead to reduction of tension and therefore that discussion of disarmament could go forward simultaneously with attempts to solve other international political problems.

The General Assembly Resolution which resulted from the Western proposals set forth as the aim of the newly constituted Disarmament Commission a draft treaty calling for: 1, regulation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; 2, elimination of weapons of mass destruction; 3, effective international control of atomic energy; 4, safeguards. This became the framework for all of the Western proposals until 1956. The new Disarmament Commission held its first meeting dealing with substance on March 14, 1952. The United States

¹³ “Stockholm Appeal of the World Peace Council, March 19, 1950,” in U.S. Dept. of State, *Documents on Disarmament*, Vol. I (1945-56), Publication 7008 (August, 1960), p. 252.

Representative, Benjamin V. Cohen, after introducing a short draft plan, made a plea with almost religious fervor for rapid progress toward the goal of a world where national armaments would be reduced drastically and where mass destruction would be eliminated so that no state need fear aggression from another state. In reply, the Soviet Representative, Y. A. Malik, accused the United States of waging bacteriological warfare in North Korea and Communist China, a completely irrelevant issue brought forward solely for purposes of propaganda.

Despite the discouraging start, the Western Powers during the next four months brought forward a series of proposals for comprehensive disarmament which covered many, if not all, of the chief segments of the problem. In presenting his proposals, Ambassador Cohen had stressed, "These proposals are intended only to provide a basis for discussion; they are not intended to express definitive or inflexible positions of my Government."

In 1952, the most important Western proposals dealt with three main topics: the objectives of a disarmament program, safeguards, and limitation of armed forces and armaments. A paper submitted by the United States entitled "Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program"¹⁴ suggested that the goal of disarmament was not to regulate but to prevent war. To achieve this goal, all states must cooperate to establish an open and substantially disarmed world in which armed forces and armaments would be so reduced that no state would be in a condition to start a war and "in which no State will be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other States having knowledge of such preparation long before an offending State could start a war."

The United States made a fresh approach to the problem of safeguards in a paper entitled "Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments."¹⁵ This was the first paper introduced into this set of meetings and the first United States proposal of consequence since the Baruch Plan. In this

paper, the United States recognized that in the existing state of international tension it was impossible to suggest immediate disclosure by all states of their military secrets. Therefore, disclosure and verification would take place in stages proceeding from the less secret areas to the more secret areas. Disclosure of atomic weapons must accompany disclosure of arms, armed forces and conventional weapons. The United States for the first time recognized that it was desirable to arrange the inspection system in such a manner that "verification can take place with a minimum of interference in the internal life of the respective countries."

A paper introduced by France, the United Kingdom and the United States on May 28, called for the numerical limitation of all armed forces. This paper was supplemented by a further paper introduced on August 12, suggesting the approach toward limiting armaments as well as armed forces. These papers, which were the answer of the West to the Soviet proposals for one-third reduction of armed forces and armaments, in essence proposed ceilings for the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the United States, China, the United Kingdom and France. Ceilings would be worked out for other states having substantial forces. Arms would be limited to such as were necessary and appropriate to maintain the ceilings proposed for the armed forces.

The Soviet reaction to the Western proposals was completely negative. The Soviet Union itself made no proposals to the Disarmament Commission. The only Soviet-written paper was a plan of work which would have pre-determined the outcome of the discussions. Its first item was "Adoption of a Decision on the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and all other kinds of weapons of mass destruction and on the establishment of strict international control over the observance of such prohibition, it being understood that the prohibition of atomic weapons and international control shall be put into effect simultaneously."¹⁶ This was typical of all of the items in the Plan of Work. They did not state the subject for discussion but the conclusion which must result from the discussion. The Soviet speeches were only rarely addressed to the issues before the Disarmament Commission,

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, *United States Efforts Toward Disarmament*, Report to the President by the Deputy U.S. Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission, Publication 4902 (February, 1953), pp. 5-6.

¹⁵ U.N. Disarmament Commission, *Official Records*, Special Supplement No. 1, pp. 22-30.

¹⁶ U.N. document DC/4/Rev.1 (March 19, 1952), text in DC/20, pp. 6-7.

and, consisted almost entirely of propaganda invective appropriate for republication in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* and for international broadcast.

By August, 1952, it had become apparent that no progress was possible. The Session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1952 took place during the presidential campaign in the United States. It would have been difficult for the United States representative to express any official view on disarmament until after the election and until there was some indication of the attitude of the new Administration. President Eisenhower, in his inaugural address and in a much more detailed statement made on April 8, 1953, stated clearly his support of the approach of the previous Administration to the problems of disarmament. However, partly because of the death of Stalin and the obvious inability of the Soviet representatives to reach new decisions, the next serious discussions of disarmament did not take place until the General Assembly Session in the fall of 1953. At that time representatives of some of the smaller powers proposed and both the Soviet Union and Western powers agreed that "the Representatives of the Principal Powers involved should seek in private an acceptable solution and report to the Disarmament Commission."

The Disarmament Commission in April, 1954, established a Subcommittee consisting of representatives of Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States to discuss in private the entire problem of disarmament. This Subcommittee continued as the negotiating group until September, 1957. Morehead Patterson, a prominent industrial leader, was appointed to represent the United States on this Subcommittee which met in its first session in May and June.

In substance the meetings of the Subcommittee were a continuation of the 1952 discussions of the Disarmament Commission. The Western Powers filled in the two important gaps in the previous Western proposals. The United States introduced a paper outlining the type of international control authority required to ensure the implementation of a program of comprehensive disarmament.

¹⁷ U.N. Document DC/SC.1/10 (June 11, 1954), pp. 21-22.

The United Kingdom and France towards the end of the discussions on June 11, 1954, introduced a Memorandum on phasing and timing the elements of a disarmament program.¹⁷ On this subject the Soviet Union had always maintained a consistent position: reductions and prohibitions must precede the installation of controls. While the West had proposed that the installation of controls and likewise the prohibitions and limitations should take place by stages, there were no Western proposals indicating the time relationship between the installation of controls and the effective date of the prohibitions and reductions. The Anglo-French Memorandum sought to remedy this difficulty and thus to find a middle ground between the Soviet position and the previous Western positions.

The United States gave general support to the British-French Memorandum, explaining that support did not necessarily include endorsement of every detail. The United States anticipated that when the states got down to drawing up a treaty, the matter of carrying out the treaty would be more complicated than was indicated in the Anglo-French Memorandum. This foreshadowed the reappraisal of all positions as a result of the development of thermonuclear weapons.

The Soviet delegate emphatically rejected the Western proposals, but his speeches were less blatantly propagandistic and at least dealt with the subjects under discussion.

Policy Reappraisals

At the very end of the first session of the Subcommittee, in June, 1954, members of the Soviet delegation at the official level gave some intimations to their opposite numbers in the United States and United Kingdom delegations of an impending change in Soviet policy. This change would be linked to a new Soviet policy of increasing cultural and economic contacts with the West. The changed policy became official when Soviet Delegate Andrei Vyshinsky at the opening of the General Assembly in September, 1954, suggested that the Anglo-French memorandum be used as the basis for an international treaty.

Vyshinsky sought to create the impression that the Soviet Union had accepted practically the entire Western position and that agreement on a disarmament treaty would

be fairly simple and quick. The extended discussions in the General Assembly showed some change in Soviet positions but there were tremendous areas where the Soviet and Western positions remained far apart. It was unanimously agreed that additional private sessions of the Subcommittee were essential and might be helpful in bridging the gap. Accordingly the Subcommittee reconvened in February, 1955. In March of the same year, President Eisenhower appointed Governor Harold Stassen to the newly created position of Special Adviser on Disarmament with Cabinet rank. Stassen assumed responsibility for the negotiations at the third session of the Subcommittee in August, 1955.

During March and April, 1955, the Soviet Union in its negotiating reverted to its pre-1954 intransigent positions. Suddenly without warning on May 10, 1955, the Soviet Union submitted new and vastly changed proposals.¹⁸ In essence these proposals suggested three separate means for reducing tensions and eliminating the arms race. The first section called for political settlements to end the cold war and was only remotely related to disarmament. The second section followed the format of the Western proposals in calling for comprehensive disarmament in stages, and was far closer to the Western position than previous Soviet proposals.

The really startling changes in Soviet position were contained in the third part which had a long preamble pointing out that the production of fissionable materials had now reached a point where "there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of hydrogen and atomic weapons." Therefore, in lieu of a program for comprehensive disarmament, the Soviet Union was willing to proceed with partial measures that would improve world confidence and permit more extensive agreements when confidence became greater.

Even more startling was the Soviet suggestion of an international control organ including the power "to exercise control, including inspection on a continuing basis to the extent necessary to insure implementation

of the above mentioned convention by all States."

The eminent statesman and scholar, Philip Noel-Baker, speaks of May 10, 1955, as "the moment of hope."¹⁹ Jules Moch, the French Representative and the Dean of all Western disarmament negotiators immediately responded: "I would almost say the whole thing looks too good to be true." The Soviet Union had certainly gone a long distance in accepting in principle the main Western positions. This is of course far removed from agreement on a detailed and practical program to implement the principles.

The new Soviet position unquestionably was a part of the vast change in the Soviet Union that followed the death of Stalin. Closely related to this changed viewpoint were statements of Soviet leaders bringing home to their populations the consequences of thermonuclear warfare—mutual devastation, if not mutual destruction. The Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955, at a minimum established a framework for future negotiations taking account of the thermonuclear revolution.

The United States planning, as evidenced by President Eisenhower's memorable address to the United Nations on December 8, 1953, on the peaceful uses of the atom, had been following parallel lines. The indicated next step would be a negotiation to transform the apparent agreement in principle into a convention.

Since a Summit Meeting was scheduled in Geneva in July, it was logical for the Disarmament Subcommittee to adjourn until after the Summit Meeting. At the Summit Meeting, Eisenhower suggested as a first and separable confidence building measure his proposal for "open skies"—complete aerial reconnaissance to lessen the danger of surprise attack. The Soviet Union then made suggestions for ground control posts to prevent large military formations in tinder-box areas. Both of these proposals played a large role in later negotiations. However, the United States proposal was far too limited in its scope to be a full response to the Soviet program of May 10.

The United States response came on August 29, 1955, when the Subcommittee reconvened with Stassen sitting for the first time as the United States negotiator. Stassen

¹⁸ Annex U.N. Document DC/SC/26/Rev. 2, May 10, 1955.

¹⁹ Philip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race* (1958), Chapter 2.

referred to the new international situation under which it was no longer possible to determine through inspection compliance with any agreements involving past nuclear production. Accordingly he said:

The United States does now place a reservation upon all of its pre-Geneva substantive positions taken in this Subcommittee or in the Disarmament Commission or in the United Nations on these questions in relationship to levels of armaments pending the outcome of our study jointly or separately of inspection methods and control arrangements and of review of this important problem.²⁰

This statement in effect withdrew all past United States positions regardless of their relation to the problem of nuclear materials accountability, including proposals which had contributed greatly to the prestige of the United States such as the 1952 paper on "Essential Principles for a Disarmament Programme." This latter paper made its next appearance when Khrushchev quoted it almost literally but without attribution in his address to the United Nations in September, 1959, and received great acclaim for his position. The new broom was sweeping clean.

After the destruction of the old framework, the negotiations floundered for two years until the construction of a new framework containing many elements that had been swept away in August, 1955.

Lost Opportunities

In perspective it is apparent that no genuine accord was possible between the Soviet Union and the West during the period of this study (1946-1955).

The Baruch proposals were good proposals: the best that could have been anticipated in the light of the revolution in international thinking that had to accompany the nuclear revolution. The rigidity of the Soviet position during the last days of Stalin would have prevented any East-West agreement in the field of disarmament short of a complete surrender by the West. Therefore, the failure to reach an accord which would lessen the menace of nuclear warfare during the years when the United States alone had

nuclear weapons cannot be termed a lost opportunity.

The United States, however, during the negotiations on the Baruch Plan did have the opportunity of demonstrating convincingly to the world that the one overwhelming obstacle to East-West agreement in the field of disarmament was the Soviet insistence on maintaining its secrecy. The United States emphasis on less important issues such as the extent of the veto in the Security Council, and the failure of the United States to develop a logical position on reduction of conventional armaments tended to obscure the one main issue, the Soviet Iron Curtain. To this extent, the course of negotiations in the period from 1946 through 1948 represented a lost opportunity.

From 1952 through 1954 the Western Powers pursued an approach directed toward the objective of comprehensive disarmament which had great political appeal throughout the world and which remedied most of the shortcomings of the earlier approach. The thermonuclear revolution required basic changes in that approach. The reaction of Soviet leaders to the thermonuclear revolution, however, to a large degree paralleled the reaction of the West. With the relaxation of Soviet rigidity after the death of Stalin, a genuine negotiation now became possible within the framework of the previous Western approach modified to meet the novel situation created by thermonuclear weapons. Yet after May 10, 1955, the United States destroyed the framework of the negotiations by withdraw-

(Continued on p. 280)

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²⁰ U.N. Document DC/SC.1/PV54, September 1, 1955, pp. 26, 27.

Summarizing negotiations since 1955, this specialist calls attention to "the crucial point that has never really been resolved in all the long negotiations, namely the United States insistence on effective international inspection, and Soviet suspicion of the same as a cover for espionage."

Disarmament: The Last Seven Years

By ALLAN S. NANES

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FOR THE students of disarmament and practitioners of the delicate art of disarmament negotiation, 1955 marked a watershed. In that year both the United States and the Soviet Union came to the realization that as long as they held to their previous positions they would be pursuing a will o' the wisp. It was no longer practical for the United States to insist on international control of nuclear production, with "condign punishments" for all violators, nor for the Soviet Union to require that nuclear weapons be outlawed and nuclear production cease before any control regime be instituted. In point of fact, technology had outrun policy, a not unfamiliar phenomenon on the international scene. Such large quantities of fissionable materials were in the hands of both great antagonists in the cold war that it would be impossible for any inspectorate to ferret them all out. This is to say nothing of the fact that no method of inspection has yet been devised which is guaranteed to detect underground stockpiles.

Recognition of the changed situation was signaled for the United States by Harold Stassen's reservation of August 29, 1955,

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"which in effect, rescinded the United States position on all former proposals."¹ The Soviet Union, on its part, conceded that the reduction and limitation of armaments need not precede the establishment of a control plan, and it publicly agreed with the Western position that it was no longer possible to devise a control system that would account for all past production of fissionable materials.

In short, the control of production was no longer the key to the control of nuclear arms. The main problem was now one of devising methods to prevent the use of these weapons in sudden nuclear attack.

At the Foreign Ministers' meeting in October, 1955, the Soviet Union indicated a willingness to accept aerial photography as one form of arms control. But the Russians regarded it as a final, rather than an initial step. Molotov argued that prior aerial reconnaissance would merely intensify the chances of surprise attack. He also argued that since only the United States and the U.S.S.R. were involved, there was no safety from attack from overseas bases.

Secretary Dulles made it clear that we would negotiate to extend the President's aerial reconnaissance proposals to cover our overseas bases if the Soviet Union would accept them as originally proposed, but this Molotov refused to do.

The aerial reconnaissance proposals were aimed at building confidence, as was a previous Soviet proposal for ground control posts. "Confidence-building" now became a basic

¹ Bechhoefer, Bernhard G. *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*, Washington. The Brookings Institution, 1961, p. 564. See also Bechhoefer's article, above.

element of American disarmament policy. The tenth General Assembly of the United Nations, in December, 1955, called upon the U.N. Disarmament Commission's Subcommittee to give priority in its negotiations to confidence building measures. At that same session the Assembly suggested that account be taken of various proposals for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the establishment of an armaments truce.

When the Subcommittee reconvened in March, 1956, it was against the background of the United States reappraisal of its disarmament policy signaled by the Stassen reservation and the Geneva proposals. But prior to the first meeting of the Subcommittee, President Eisenhower advanced a new and important proposal in a letter to Premier Bulganin on March 1, 1956. He indicated that, assuming the satisfactory operation of ground and air inspection, the United States would be ready, in conjunction with other nations, to work out suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world would no longer be used to increase the stockpile of nuclear explosive weapons. The President also suggested that this proposal be combined with his "atoms for peace" plan; he further indicated his belief that disarmament could be achieved more effectively through limitations on armaments rather than on men. It might be difficult to agree on reductions in the armed forces, but it should be possible to agree on measures controlling and limiting the major types of armaments. In the correspondence that followed it appeared for a time that the Soviet and American positions were approaching each other, but in May, 1956, the Russians denounced the "open skies" proposal as something of interest to the intelligence services, but not useful from the standpoint of arms control.

Stassen's Plan, 1956

At the London meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee, in March-May of 1956, Stassen offered several proposals, two having to do with the study and negotia-

tion of an inspection system, and the third outlining the first stage of a comprehensive and safeguarded disarmament plan. The first proposal called for demonstration test areas, that is, the designation of areas of 20,000-30,000 square miles by the United States and the Soviet Union, within which methods of control and inspection could be tested. The second proposal called for the exchange of technical missions of 30-70 persons among the five member nations of the Subcommittee, to study the problem of inspection and control.

Stassen's disarmament plan began with these two proposals. Then a preparatory commission would be established, which would fix the reductions in manpower for each state during the first phase of disarmament. Anticipating the activities of such a commission, the United States suggested that during this first phase the United States and the Soviet Union cut their armed forces to 2,500,000, and the United Kingdom and France cut theirs to 750,000 each. Proportionate reductions in armaments and military budgets were to follow. Then there would be the exchange of full military blueprints, and a freeze of defense budgets as of December 31, 1955.

The control and full inspection system would then go into effect concurrently. An Armaments Regulation Commission would be set up, which other nations would join, and to which they would divulge information on their nuclear stockpiles, production and plans for nuclear tests. There would then be another freeze, this time on fissionable material produced for nuclear weapons, a limitation of nuclear tests, and progressive reductions of manpower. If all of this were achieved, the nations could go on to consider further measures of disarmament.²

At this point the British and French attempted to play the role of honest brokers between the United States and the Soviet Union, a role they had essayed earlier. They submitted a joint proposal to this London meeting which sought to reconcile American demands for inspection and control first, and Soviet insistence on arms reduction prior to inspection. First there would be a declaration renouncing the use of nuclear weapons except in defense against aggression. Then there would be a freeze on current arma-

² U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Control and Reduction of Armaments. A Decade of Negotiations, 1946-1956.* Staff Study No. 3, Subcommittee on Disarmament, 84th Congress, 2d Session. Committee print. U.S. G.P.O., Washington, 1956, pp. 14-15.

ment levels plus effective air and ground inspection. Then reductions in conventional armaments, and restrictions on nuclear tests. In the last stage conventional arms would be cut, nuclear tests banned, and the production and use of nuclear weapons prohibited.³ With admirable French logic, Jules Moch summed up the proposal, "Neither control without disarmament, nor disarmament without control, but, progressively, all the disarmament which can be controlled."⁴ However, this lucid formula was not enough to bridge the gap separating the principal antagonists.

Yet for a time at the Disarmament Subcommittee meetings at London, in 1956, it appeared that progress was being made. For one thing, the Russians omitted their usual demand for a ban on nuclear weapons as the first step toward arms limitation. While calling for a freeze on current levels of armed forces, armaments and military budgets, they also called for the creation of an international disarmament control agency, with unimpeded access at all times to all objects of control. Financial records were to be open to the inspectors of this agency, who were to be positioned in good time prior to the entry into force of the agreement, so that they could begin to function as soon as such entry took place. The Russian position, according to the State Department, "represented Soviet acceptance of a principle they had resisted for years."⁵ As far as troop strength was concerned, the Russians suggested 1.5 million for themselves, the Communist Chinese, and the United States, 650,000 apiece for Great Britain and France, and 150-200 thousand for all others. Germany and adjacent states would constitute a "zone of limitation and inspection of armaments," in which foreign troops would be limited, and nuclear weapons banned.

Major Differences, 1956

Despite this apparent progress, major differences still divided the Western powers and the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. still refused to accept aerial inspection in the first

phase of disarmament. It still wanted any control action subject to Security Council decision, and hence to the veto. Furthermore it wanted predetermined transition dates from one stage of disarmament to the next, whether control machinery was functioning successfully or not. Finally, the Russians wanted phased reduction in conventional forces independent of progress in making political settlements or controlling nuclear weapons. It might also be noted that in their proposals for ground inspection, the Soviets omitted any mention of inspection of installations related to nuclear energy.

The U.N. Disarmament Commission met in New York in July, 1956, to discuss the Subcommittee's report, but took no significant action. Andrei Gromyko did state that the Soviet government intended to reduce its armed forces by 1.2 million before May 1, 1957, in addition to the reduction of 640,000 announced in 1955. He gave no totals for Soviet forces after these reductions, but the following July he indicated that the Soviet Union would accept the previously advanced Western figures of 2.5 million for the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and China, and 750,000 for the United Kingdom and France as first stage force levels. That latter statement, however, included the usual Russian provisos for an unconditional ban on the use of nuclear weapons, destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and so on. Once again, no concrete result ensued.

Following this Subcommittee session, President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin exchanged several letters on disarmament. This exchange took place over a period of several months, and ironically, one of Bulganin's letters was sent during the Soviet campaign to crush the Hungarian uprising.

The one new feature of this exchange was a Soviet declaration to the effect that it was prepared to consider the use of aerial photography to a depth of 800 kilometers on each side of the line of demarcation between the military forces of the East and West. This was interpreted as a hopeful sign, but the United States remained committed to the aerial inspection of the United States and the U.S.S.R.

At the eleventh General Assembly, in January, 1957, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. set forth a United States plan under which all

³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ U.S. Department of State. *Disarmament. The Intensified Effort 1955-1958*. Department of State Publication 6676. July, 1958, p. 25.

future production of fissionable materials would be stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international agreement. After this, nuclear weapons stockpiles could be reduced, and some fissionable material could be diverted to peaceful uses. There would be a reduction of conventional forces to totals previously suggested by the United States, accompanied by the progressive establishment of effective inspection, which included aerial and ground aspects. Further reductions in conventional forces would depend on the progress of political settlements.

The proposal also included a provision for the eventual limitation and then cessation of nuclear tests, but this would have to wait on the establishment of controls on the production of fissionable materials. In the meantime this country would agree to work out methods for the advance notice and registration of all nuclear tests, and to provide for limited international inspection of same. Finally, as a first step toward the use of outer space for purely peaceful purposes, this country suggested that the testing of objects propelled through it be established under international inspection and participation.

The Soviet position at this session of the Assembly was disappointing. The U.S.S.R. made no new proposals on the problem of control, and denounced the Western view that political settlements were inseparable from general disarmament.

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the Assembly, from the standpoint of disarmament, was the interest shown on all sides in the question of nuclear testing.

On March 18, 1957, the Disarmament Subcommittee met again in London, and launched the most intensive effort yet at disarmament. The object was to frame an acceptable first stage, confidence-building agreement. The three major proposals before the negotiators were: an Anglo-French plan, a Soviet plan, and a United States plan. Under the first of these, comprehensive disarmament would take place in three stages. Limitations on testing, and the development of nuclear controls would take place in the second stage, and prohibitions on the testing, manufacture and use of nu-

clear weapons would become effective in the third. The Soviet proposals strongly emphasized the suggestion made by Premier Bulganin earlier of an 800 kilometer inspection zone in Europe and repeated the ceilings for conventional forces he had advanced in his correspondence with President Eisenhower. The United States reiterated the proposals advanced by Ambassador Lodge at the eleventh General Assembly.

A Negotiable Russian Position

During the meetings the Soviet Union came forward with a new proposal, reaffirming first its acceptance of the force goals proposed by the United States, but conditioning this upon prior acceptance of second stage force goals corresponding to totals earlier advanced by the Soviet Union. It also reaffirmed its earlier proposal for a 15 per cent cut in conventional armaments and military budgets. However, the Soviet plan now envisioned a more limited control organ than it had previously accepted in principle. Mention of unimpeded access to objects of control was dropped, and although there was provision for a control organ, it was to be established within the framework of the Security Council.

Insofar as atomic weapons were concerned, the Soviet Union still insisted on an unqualified prohibition of their use, but dropped its demands for prohibiting their manufacture and eliminating them in the first stage of an agreement. The Russians also dropped their demand for the complete liquidation of foreign bases, but called for the elimination of some of them in the first year or two of any agreement. While our representative had mentioned an area which included both Western and Iron Curtain territory as a sector for aerial inspection, their proposal would have covered an area that was almost wholly in the West except for a small segment of the Baltic states. American proposals for inspection in the Far East were similarly altered. But the Soviet Union softened its stand by indicating informally that these zones could be subject to negotiation.⁶

The Soviet Union had retreated from its earlier acceptance of adequate control apparatus, yet its position, in our view, was

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39.

negotiable. It represented a willingness to move. The Western nations now sought an acceptable compromise formula.

While this search was going on, the Soviet representative announced, on June 14, 1957, that his government was now willing to recognize the Western contention that any cessation of nuclear tests should be subject to control. He therefore proposed a two to three year moratorium on tests, under the supervision of an international commission. This commission would have control posts in the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the "Pacific area." But it would be answerable to the Security Council and the General Assembly, which meant that the veto would apply.

The West sensed this as a Soviet concession, and accepted the proposal, subject to precise agreements on the duration and timing of a test suspension, on the location of control posts, on the relation of this measure to other provisions of a first stage disarmament agreement, and on the stoppage of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. On its part, the United States announced its willingness to have the suspension of testing begin with the ratification of a first-step treaty. Two American proposals on timing and duration eventually produced a position close to that of the Soviets. We would support what amounted to a two year suspension on testing, which would be the first step toward safeguarded disarmament.

The Soviet Union also modified its position on aerial inspection zones to include a zone whose center ran through the Soviet zone of Germany, and a zone for the United States-U.S.S.R. in the Pacific. On behalf of all the Nato governments, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and France offered the Soviet Union its choice of either broad or more limited inspection zones in the northern hemisphere and in Europe. But the latter offer depended on Soviet acceptance of the former. The Soviet Union confounded these plans by a simple unwillingness to discuss either European zone.

A similar hopeful beginning on force levels and armaments also foundered. The Soviet Union was willing to go along with an

American proposal for a second step reduction in armed forces to 2.1 million for each, and to negotiate further reductions as the inspection system was expanded and the initial reductions were completed. But the Russians would not join in actual working discussions for first step reductions unless other members of the Disarmament Subcommittee abandoned their insistence on political settlements as a prerequisite to further force reductions.

Comprehensive Western Plan, 1957

Despite these setbacks, the West had pressed forward with its consultations, and now was ready with a comprehensive proposal. Put forward on August 29, 1957, it comprised the following interdependent steps: 1) Cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This was to take place as soon as an inspection system capable of verifying it had been agreed upon and put into effect. 2) Cessation of nuclear weapons testing. Suspension for 24 months while a cutoff date for production was being worked out. 3) Reduction of existing nuclear stockpiles. 4) Storage of agreed armaments in specified depots under international supervision. Limitation of armed forces in the first step, 2.5 million for the United States and Soviet Union, 750,000 for the United Kingdom and France. Further reductions to follow. 5) Inspection safeguards against surprise attack. Aerial inspection, with specified ground inspection posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways, mobile ground teams, airfields, and so on. 6) No use of nuclear weapons except if armed attack placed a state in a position requiring individual or collective self-defense. 7) Beginning measures on the control of outer space for peaceful purposes. 8) Beginning study of a system for controlling the import and export of arms. 9) Establishment of an International Control Organization under the aegis of the Security Council, with jurisdiction over all control and inspection services. 10) Each party could suspend its obligations by written notice, partially or completely, in the event another party committed an important violation, or any other state took action so prejudicial to the suspending state's security as to require this suspension.'

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

Whatever hopes were nurtured in the West for Soviet acceptance of this comprehensive proposal were rudely and quickly dashed. Two days before the West presented its proposal the Soviet delegate, Valerian Zorin, had bitterly attacked the West, and the day they were presented he rejected them as unacceptable. But they were subsequently endorsed in the twelfth session of the General Assembly by a vote of 57-9, with 15 abstentions.

At that same Assembly session the Soviet Union declared in Committee I that it would not participate in further deliberations of the Disarmament Commission and its Subcommittee as they were then constituted. Instead it called for a Commission composed of all the members of the United Nations. As matters turned out, the membership of the Commission was expanded to 25, and eventually, although not at this session, the Russians won their point as the Disarmament Commission was enlarged to include the entire U.N. membership.

But the failure of the 1957 negotiations marked at least a temporary end to disarmament negotiations through U.N. organs. At the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva in 1959 it was decided to attempt other negotiations. A ten-nation group, consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland and Rumania was convened. This group was evenly balanced between free world and Soviet bloc countries.

Ten-Nation Conference, 1960

This ten-nation disarmament conference got under way on March 15, 1960. The Communist bloc offered a plan for "general and complete disarmament," echoing the phrase of Khrushchev when he addressed the General Assembly in September, 1959. This proposal called for the achievement of complete disarmament within four years, the disarmament to take place in three stages. In stage one there would be a significant reduction of conventional forces; in the second stage complete disbandment of all remaining armed forces and the elimination of

all foreign military bases. Stage three would see the total elimination or destruction of all means of waging war, including nuclear weapons and missiles. A control organ would supervise implementation of the agreement, and the extent of control would grow progressively with the extent of disarmament. The control organ would have free access to all the objects of control, upon the attainment of general and complete disarmament.⁸

The West advanced its own counter-proposal, detailing certain initial steps, and stressing the need for verification and compliance at each stage. The Western plan also called for three stage disarmament, with measures against surprise attack and accidental war, cessation of nuclear production, destruction of stockpiles, balanced reduction of armed forces, and initial steps to assure the peaceful use of outer space all coming in the first two stages. The third stage was far-reaching in its implications, outlining measures to reduce armed forces to levels required for internal security and the buildup of an international enforcement system under universally accepted rules of law.

Each side now probed the other's position, and each drew up a statement of principles, presumably to clarify and elaborate its position. But agreement could not be reached. To the West, the various Soviet proposals and statements lacked concreteness and definition, while the Soviet Union was disappointed with the West's failure to accept the principle of general and complete disarmament as the prerequisite to further negotiation. With negotiations once again at an impasse, the Conference recessed for the May, 1960, summit meeting.

The abortive nature of that meeting and Khrushchev's violent attacks on the United States hardly afforded a propitious atmosphere in which to reconvene. Nevertheless the Conference was resumed, and on June 2, 1960, the Soviet Union presented a revised plan which provided for abolition in the first stage of the means of delivering nuclear weapons (a proposal first advanced by France in October, 1959). Russia also suggested a joint study of ways to maintain peace, called for the creation of a U.N. police force, and as usual suggested the elimination of overseas bases.

⁸ U.S. Department of State. *Disarmament at a Glance*. Department of State Publication 7058. General Foreign Policy Series 154. U.S., G.P.O., July, 1960, pp. 2-3.

Although from the Western point of view the Soviet proposals would have unbalanced the military environment in an unfavorable direction, there seemed to be some slight element of give in their position. The head of our delegation returned to Washington for consultations, during which revised American proposals were prepared. These new proposals remained faithful to the general American position that consideration should be given to measures of disarmament, subject to control, which could be implemented prior to the detailed and difficult discussions leading to general disarmament. But they did contain modifications reflecting the views of our allies and certain views of the Soviets. Before our representative could formally present these proposals, however, the Russians repeated their action of two years before, and torpedoed the Ten Nation Conference with a series of violent attacks, followed by a walkout, on June 27, 1960.

Despite the Soviet walkout, an American proposal was formally submitted. It put greater stress on preventing surprise attack and on eliminating delivery systems for nuclear weapons. The Western delegations remained in Geneva hoping for the Soviet delegation to return, but when it did not, the Western delegations withdrew.

Once again the Russians dispelled some of the gloom by appearing at the Disarmament Commission meetings which got under way the following August. At the Commission meetings, and later at the Assembly, the United States proposed the immediate or gradual cessation of weapons grade fissionable material. As a first step this country offered to transfer 30 tons of enriched uranium from weapons stockpiles to peaceful activities, under impartial verification, provided the U.S.S.R. would do the same. But Khrushchev had already repeated before the Assembly that it would be meaningless to make any such transfer unless all accumulated stockpiles were destroyed.

Resolutions of 1960

Thirteen resolutions on disarmament were presented to the General Assembly in 1960. The major Western proposal was a complete package, largely reiterating previous proposals. The Russians dropped their four-

year time limit on disarmament, and seemed to accept inspection of all disarmament measures and a U.N. police force under Security Council control. But these apparent concessions were countered by the demand for the "troika," a three-man directorate to be substituted for the U.N. Secretary-General. This killed the plan as far as the West was concerned.

Since that time there have been no formal multilateral discussions on disarmament, except insofar as the subject has been discussed by the General Assembly. The United States advanced a new proposal in the General Assembly last September, however, designed to couple a general disarmament plan with a strengthened international peacekeeping apparatus. Under this proposal, additional measures are provided for control of nuclear weapons during the first stage of any agreement. These measures include adherence to a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons production prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear nations, as well as information or material for their manufacture, and the establishment of a group of experts to examine means for reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear stocks. There is more emphasis on the control of vehicles which might deliver nuclear weapons.

Conventional force levels were set at 2.1 million for the United States and the Soviet Union in the first stage. Aerial inspection was omitted as a safeguard against surprise attack, but ground inspection was specifically provided. Certain military bases, to be agreed upon, would be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses. Finally, no reference was made to military expenditures by either side.

An expanded disarmament conference was resumed as scheduled in March. As a result of an agreement between Valerian Zorin and John J. McCloy this conference was to be guided by the following principles: the long-range goal would be general disarmament, to be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Armed forces would be disbanded, nuclear stockpiles eliminated, delivery systems abolished, military training and expenditures discontinued. Nations would be allowed to retain forces only large

enough to insure internal order, and would provide agreed manpower for a U.N. peace force.

This agreement would be implemented in stages, in a balanced fashion, under strict and effective international control. Such control would be the province of an International Disarmament Organization, whose inspectors would be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places necessary for effective verification. But these goals are essentially those of the disarmament effort of the past seven years, which have so far been unrealized.

Tests and Test Bans

The aspect of disarmament that has been most in the public eye has been the effort to achieve a nuclear test ban. This effort was ironically highlighted when the Soviet Union broke the moratorium on testing last fall for its series of tests climaxed by a blast in excess of 50 megatons. However, the preceding spring the test ban conference had been pretty well torpedoed when the Russians had insisted on the troika for a control commission to police a test ban, after previously accepting a single administrator. They also argued that the United States and Britain were profiting from French nuclear testing, although the fact is that both countries opposed the French tests. Despite these attitudes, and even despite the callous Soviet disregard of its word in the resumption of testing, the Western powers went back to Geneva to see if anything could be salvaged. Eventually Tsarapkin made it plain that the Soviet Union was not interested in a test ban.

If we attempt to assess the progress toward disarmament over the past seven years, our conclusions cannot be very sanguine. Essentially, the disarmament talks have failed. No general agreement has been signed and prospects for a test ban, which once appeared so promising, are currently very dim. The West and the Soviet Union are still far apart on a number of issues. The Soviet insistence

on full agreement on all aspects of general and complete disarmament before implementing a single measure is one major stumbling block. Its insistence on a fixed time limit for the entire disarmament process is another. Its refusal to agree to verification of agreed levels of forces and armaments to be retained, except for national police forces remaining after general and complete disarmament, is a third. Indeed this third point is another aspect of the first, and forms the crucial point that has never really been resolved in all the long negotiations, namely the United States insistence on effective international inspection, and Soviet suspicion of the same as a cover for espionage. There are many other details where both sides differ, but considerations of space preclude their listing here.⁹ Suffice it to say that inspection is the sticking point.

Under these conditions, what can we hope for? Are there any new avenues for negotiation? Perhaps a reversion to a limitation on conventional weapons and forces would be one. An agreement to prohibit nuclear detonations in outer space might be another. Both sides might agree not to transmit nuclear data to third parties, as both have an interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. All of these attempt to start simply, although that approach has been unfruitful so far. To attempt to strike a broad-gauged disarmament agreement might suit the Soviet mood of the moment, but it is difficult to envision this approach leading to any meaningful result.

If there appears no pathway out of this morass there is at least one reason for hope, the growing public consciousness of the utterly destructive character of modern weapons. It is that consciousness which is becoming increasingly articulate, which is nagging at the conscience of governments, and which may force them to some sort of a disarmament agreement in spite of themselves.

⁹ For a point by point comparison see *Disarmament: Two Approaches*. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 1. U.S., G.P.O., Washington, November, 1961.

"... However inverted the logic may appear to us, it is quite clear that they [the Soviets] seriously contend that the only danger to 'peace' is from those who propose to stand firm against their aggression, those who would risk war rather than surrender the values of a free society."—Paul H. Nitze, *U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs*, September 7, 1961.

Once the West has satisfied four requirements outlined by this specialist, "it is entirely within the Western capability unilaterally to end our part of the arms race, and thereby to accomplish the most effective form of arms control, namely, self control. We do not have to wait for the millennium of 'agreement.'"

The Case for Deterrence

By THOMAS E. PHIPPS

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IN what follows¹ the writer will attempt to convince the reader of some rather improbable-sounding propositions, *e.g.*: that those who would love peace wisely should not love her too well; that the key to avoiding big wars may be the fighting of little ones; and so on. To introduce such improbabilities in an appropriate atmosphere of fantasy, we ask you, the reader, to set aside your American citizenship for a moment.

Imagine that you are the heir of a long and dark tradition of oppression, unlightened by any counter-tradition of liberal humanitarianism. You carry in your bones the memory of numberless invasions by hostile foreigners, by Germans, by Americans and British, by Frenchmen, by Swedes, by Teutonic Knights, by Turks, Goths, Sarmatians, Scythians, Cimmerians, back into ancestral times of pre-history. The coveting of your

rich heartland by generations of piratical, bloodsucking foreign imperialist-colonialist bandits has left you with a legacy of little tricks of survival, as well as vocabulary, learned by your forebears when they were driven from their villages into the woods. You remember odd fragments of primitive life-knowledge, such as the edibility of fungi,² long forgotten in the West.

Out of the bricks and mortar of inherited hate and distrust of foreigners you and your ancestors (having consolidated the East) have built a wall against the West, compounded of inverted feelings of envy and inferiority, and cemented by the bitterness of uncounted but never final defeats. Lately there has risen to power a breed of your countrymen that has shown you how to advance the wall against the West, how to smile and smile and be a villain, how to plot and cabal and infiltrate and at length to savor that which you find incomparably sweet: the taste of long-deferred victory. Now at last, in fulfillment of the dreams of millennia, you are privileged to see the West reel back, while your increasingly-irresistible troika gains momentum, and the hated and despised foreigners turn hastily from threats to talk of disarmament, arms control and negotiated settlement.

With the stage thus set by our bit of make-believe, and the proper mood music supplied, the Western reader is perhaps better prepared

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¹ The views expressed in this article are the private opinions of the author and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the naval service at large.

² V. P. and R. G. Wasson, *Mushrooms, Russia and History*, Vol. I, New York, Pantheon Books, 1957.

than he would be by wishful thinking to judge the chances of success of near-term negotiations with the Soviet bloc.

Admittedly, there is more poetry than science in the "analysis" of the peace problem just given. But a poem that conveys the proper *feeling* for the situation, for the currents of history, can be more useful than endless scientific studies that lack such a feeling. Such studies tell us that there is no logical reason why disarmament and a peaceful world should not be negotiated with the Soviet Union, since these would obviously benefit all parties concerned. Every rebuff this viewpoint receives from the objective facts of negotiation with the Soviet Union only makes the advocates of speedy negotiated settlement more stridently defensive of their position. All would be well, they seem to say, if only we would try a little harder; if only we would rid ourselves of the last damning vestiges of distrust (distrust, that is, of an opponent who, after thousands of years of search, believes that he has at length found in deceit one of the keys to final victory). One kind of science, a kind that questions *a priori* premises and accepts observational evidence, has raised the West to a great height. It would be ironical if another kind of science, a kind that clings the more tenaciously to premises the more strongly observational facts refute them, should bring it down forever.

Despite the appearance of incertitude reflected by recent questings for a United States "national purpose," there is as much agreement about goals in our society as there is disagreement about policies for their attainment. People can be for freedom and against sin, and still from a slight divergence of timetables for bringing about the advent of heaven on earth arrive at diametrically opposed policies regarding what to do *next* (the decision-maker's problem). The writer wishes to establish his *bona fides* among what he conceives to be a predominantly peace-loving readership by asserting that he loves peace and abhors the sight of blood as much as the next individual; but he does value one thing more than peace; namely, freedom. He is heartily in favor of all negotiations, settlements, postures, policies and actions that will improve the prospects for enduring freedom in the world. As the above

scenario is meant to suggest, he places a very low probability on the occurrence of negotiations or settlements of this character within the lifetime of anyone reading this page.

A Gambler's Chance

Such a view necessitates an agonizing re-drafting of Utopia's time schedule. It raises an inescapable question of *what do we do in the meantime?* If we cannot simply hurdle over mutual distrusts, how do we go about altering the ground rules of the conflicts that give rise to them? Supposing that we have formulated a coherent answer to this question, how do we gain time to put such an answer into effect? Here is where the idea of deterrence enters. It is a concept for discouraged Utopians; for those who have given up the idea of signing a paper today that will usher in the era of peace on earth and are willing to settle for this as a substantially more distant goal, to be attained only after time has worn off the hard edges of bitterness from the antagonisms that historically divide the world.

Deterrence, conceived as a permanent solution, would obviously be suicidal; for, given unlimited time, the present-day sort of world would doubtless randomly stray into thermonuclear disaster. But, with careful attention to military postural details, deterrence can be made stable enough to give freedom what the writer conceives to be its best gambler's chance of survival. Let no man pretend, though, that the risk is a "calculated" one.

Those who adopt a strategy of deterrence must do so solely for the sake of the time that deterrence buys. They would evidently be guilty of a cardinal negligence if they lacked ideas about what should be done with the time. The writer will not here attempt to lend verisimilitude to his personal opinions, but, in the hope of counteracting the false impression that advocates of deterrence do not think beyond deterrence, will boldly set down a four-step program that appeals to him as sensible:

(1) First, before any further constructive steps can be taken, it is essential that the Soviet Bloc cease to win the Cold War. Conquerors of any description (Soviet, Chinese or Martian), flushed from recent victories and full of plans for future ones, are not the

creatures with whom one bargains on terms of equality. This is not to say that the course of the Cold War must be reversed and that Latvia must be liberated. It does mean that we must at least enforce a stalemate and make "containment" something more than a bad joke.

(2) As an integral and probably prerequisite portion of the accomplishment just mentioned, we must achieve the political unification of the West, *i.e.*, the unification or federation of that self-defined community of nations in which collective freedom is valued above national sovereignty. The existence of such a community is preceded by the 13 American colonies. The need of sovereignty sacrifice (sharing) for the common defense was never more pressing than it is today, nor the prospective benefits greater. Those who believe that the first step, above, can be accomplished without the second are invited to oppose the latter.

(3) During the doubtless discouragingly long span of years needed to accomplish these drastic changes in world power relationships and political alignments, no dramatic conflict resolutions must occur, such as all-out war or surrender. Deterrence must be made to work.

(4) When the above preliminary stages have been accomplished, and the Communists have had ample opportunity to reflect on the stalemating of their plans for world hegemony; when they see that neither frontal assault nor continued conspiracy will avail them; when disappointment has mellowed into resignation; then and only then may arise *the first meaningful opportunity to parley*. At that time we can, if we like, envision achievement of other splendid internationalistic goals: the establishment of a Parliament of Man, the transfer of national armaments to a central world police authority (gradually, with retention of deterrence as a stabilizing force while mutual trust builds up, as the causes of war, rather than its instruments, are destroyed), the liquidation of national sovereignties and the differences they exacerbate. By setting down such an illustrative program the writer hopes to show that deterrence of all-out war can be fitted as a military sub-strategy into a coherent over-all political strategy. He hopes also to establish that advocates of deterrent

strategy are not necessarily less altruistic than advocates of negotiated "peace in our time"; they merely say to all the burgeoning, impatient idealisms that would have us embrace our enemies before our friends: not now, not yet.

Whatever the reader's own preferred plans for the future of the world may be, it will be assumed in the remainder of this discussion that he needs time to carry them out, and that in the meantime he is interested in choosing a strategic posture that will (at least approximately) minimize the probability of all-out war. If this assumption is correct, the reader meets the minimum requirements for an interest in deterrence; if it is incorrect, he is wasting his time to go on.

Ending the Arms Race

One of the most widely held misimpressions about deterrence is that it is necessarily associated with an arms race. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Indeed, anyone sincerely interested in stabilizing deterrence is equally interested in terminating the arms race. (Surely it requires no documentation that an arms-race atmosphere is not conducive to the stability of international relations.) In order for the Western powers to accomplish unilaterally (the only way it can be accomplished prior to the "meaningful parley" alluded to above) the cessation of the arms race four conditions must be met:

(1) There must be agreement within our own camp on the principle of retaliatory sufficiency: that there is such a thing as "enough" retaliation, independently of enemy offensive capabilities. Obviously, if revenge is not finite, if even the sundered atoms of our enemies must be separated into ever-smaller sub-particles, we can never stop running in the arms race.

(2) Strike-first, pre-emptive war, and counterforce (attack on the enemy striking force) military objectives must be abandoned. The concomitant obviously threatening postures virtually compel the opponent to an arms-race response, and (because counterforce objectives tie our force requirements to the enemy's force procurements) compel us in turn to an arms-race response.

(3) We must provide ourselves with a secure and at least statistically "invulnerable" strike-second force for all-out war, capable

of delivering the amount of retaliation we settled on in item (1) as "enough," in the face of whatever defenses the enemy may provide around his targets.

(4) To avoid the dangerously destabilizing temptation to use threats of over-reaction as a means of dealing with limited provocations, we must provide ourselves with adequate limited war forces, such that we can respond commensurately, without threatening or bluffing, to any level of armed provocation.

Let us examine these four requirements in turn. The first, recognition of retaliatory sufficiency, is gradually gaining ground in the United States, and needs little comment, apart from the remark that retaliation would seem to be logically directed against people and the things they value, such as industry and cities ("soft targets"), rather than against empty missile sites ("strike-second counterforce"). The question of whether retaliation in full force should actually take place, given occurrence of the contingency for which it has been prepared, is a separate topic, which space forbids us to treat here. Suffice it to say that a graduated form of retaliation (*e.g.*, a show of force, accompanied by threats of fuller retaliation contingent on failure to meet political conditions, including the giving of assistance in reconstruction) might more nearly maximize the residual self-interest of victims of nuclear attack than would massive retaliation.

The second requirement, elimination of counterforce and related objectives, is unlikely to be realized so long as the Soviets rely to any substantial degree on vulnerable striking systems, such as manned aircraft based in locations known to us. Abandonment of the counterforce objective will mercifully be forced upon us, as the Soviets come to rely increasingly on relatively invulnerable striking systems (*e.g.*, hidden ICBM's, mobile systems).

The third requirement, Western attainment of an effectively invulnerable strike-second system for all-out war, appears to be within the reach of present-day technology. This will be further discussed in a moment. The fourth requirement, provision of a comparatively gap-free limited war force "spectrum," is also attainable by the West, but not cheaply. Expenditures now going into cer-

tain arms-race-promoting activities would have to be diverted.

Arms Control and Self Control

Since each of the requirements just mentioned is capable of satisfaction, we conclude that, with a certain qualification to be mentioned below, it is entirely within the Western capability unilaterally to end our part of the arms race, and thereby to accomplish the most effective form of arms control, namely, self-control. We do not have to wait for the millennium of "agreement." We can stop running, stop threatening and stop worrying whenever Khrushchev develops some bigger bomb. Our armed forces will then for the first time since the second World War begin to confer on us the prime advantage great military power is traditionally supposed to provide: some measure of peace of mind. In the resulting environment, characterized by something like unilateral peace of mind, multilateral tensions will be harder to generate.

If we value stability of deterrence, which is to say our freedom and our lives, we should be well advised to take the initiative suggested here in preference to waiting for the spirit of brotherhood to bring agreement on multilateral arms control. The contention that unilateral controls must defer to multilateral ones in the interests of solving the many-nation nuclear-development problem carries little conviction in the real world. The "nth nation" we really have to worry about is China, which has shown as little interest in arms-control agreement with the United States as the United States has shown in diplomatic recognition of China.

On the feasibility of achieving an effective strike-second capability [item (3), above] a good deal of misunderstanding exists among people not familiar with the present state of weapon technology. At present, if one may be granted the liberty of a broad generalization, it seems that offense has taken a commanding lead over defense, and that the foreseeable prospects of measure-countermeasure interplay lend little support to any expectation that this relationship will be substantially altered. This is far from meaning, however, that any and all offensive systems offer invulnerability to countermeasures. Effective invulnerability is in general attainable

through system mobility, concealment, and/or disguise. Fixed-base systems, "hardened" in conformity with the fortress tradition, are increasingly vulnerable to pre-emptive attack by ever more accurate ICBM's, unless (as in the case of Soviet ICBM's) they are well-concealed. Mobile systems not thus vulnerable are exemplified by Polaris submarines at sea (mobility and concealment) or by missiles ashore in vehicles disguised as beer trucks (mobility and deception).

Another key concept for achieving the strike-second capability is the so-called "systems mix." This is simply the modern application of the ancient fascist principle, the bundle of sticks stronger than any of its individual components. A single system, such as submarines, might conceivably be vulnerable to some technological "breakthrough"; but the likelihood of simultaneous breakthroughs against several non-trivially different systems is greatly reduced. We conclude that with wise design and choice of striking systems the strike-second capability is technologically attainable. As a dividend attending its achievement, it may be mentioned that the capability for considered and deliberate response inherent in any true strike-second system greatly reduces accident-proneness and susceptibility to mistaken response (in the *n*th nation case), provided this dividend has not been traded away by designing response automaticity into the system in some fit of self-doubt.

The qualification mentioned above in respect to the feasibility of Western unilateral cessation of the arms race concerns the effects of enemy soft-target defense. To the extent that the Soviets can defend their values against our retaliation, they cease to be our hostages, and we lose the coercive influence on which deterrent stability is hypothecated to depend. As we noted, the objective feasibility of defense is marginal. Enemy attempts to seek the "defended posture" simply force us to reorient our attack, to redouble the *Schrecklichkeit* of our offense, to plan for a long war, in a classic arms race. Such "feedback" relationships are, of course, entirely symmetrical between East and West: when either party seeks unilateral "security" through a try for the defended posture, the arms race is inevitably intensified, with deleterious effects on the stability of deterrence

presumably roughly proportional to the perceived "effectiveness" of the defense.

Limitation of War

In the absence of mutual trust, verbal communications or threats of over-reaction against our enemy tend to be useless or worse. They may merely aggravate his inherent paranoid tendencies. The only way we can effectively communicate intent is by our actions. It is for this reason that the capability for commensurate reaction to military provocation is essential to long-term stabilization of the power standoff. We must "condition" our opponent to know what to expect from us, by much the same behavioral-pattern means we would employ in communicating non-verbally with one of the lower animals. The techniques of conditioning are well known. If we wish to teach our dog not to jump up, we hit him gently but firmly (commensurately to the provocation) on the nose each time he jumps up. We do not hit him ten times as hard every tenth time; that would only confuse him.

In the same way, in dealing with the peripheral expansion of the Soviet Bloc, Korean-type stalemating conditioning should be applied in every instance, without exception; with scrupulous avoidance of the current worst-possible Western behavior pattern, consisting of a series of apathetic non-reactions, building up presumably to occasional violent over-reactions. Unfortunately, it would seem from subsequent American behavior that in the Korean interaction the dog conditioned us, rather than vice-versa.

The above line of thought leads at once to the conclusion that the best way to avoid "escalation" of limited war into all-out war may be to condition our opponent into an implicit understanding of our intentions by responding consistently and commensurately to every form of armed aggression, rather than by avoiding limited war entirely. We prepare ourselves for ultimate "nibbling" defeat, and miss a golden opportunity to reinforce the "conditioning" education of our opponent, each time we acquiesce in Soviet Bloc aggression.

It goes without saying that not only must military capabilities be provided for commensurate response but also military doctrine must reflect the conditioning objective.

Against a nuclearly well-armed opponent there is, of course, little chance of the classical military "win." Military doctrine must come to reflect the contingent status of military objectives, the willingness to settle for stalemate, implied by this fact. Indeed, since the "lesson" we wish to teach our opponent is a lesson of futility—the futility of his world hegemony plans—stalemate itself seems the objective best calculated to communicate the message ungarbled. We in the United States found the Korean War a frustrating experience because it failed to provide us with the expected "win," for which our traditions had conditioned us. What we should have found frustrating was the subsequent Western conduct in failing to ingrain by consistent repetition the enemy's own "lesson of Korea."

A Consistent Plan

A great deal has necessarily been omitted from this quick survey of a strategic postural position that has sometimes, in its main aspects, been characterized by the terms "finite" or "graduated" deterrence. Perhaps we have said enough to make it clear that deterrence in itself is pointless and dangerous; that deterrence must form a consistent part

of a reasoned over-all plan of political evolution for ourselves, our opponents, and the world at large; that other parts of the same consistent plan may involve unilateral cessation of the arms race (but not disarmament), provision of adequate limited-war forces within the ethos of a commensurate-response conditioning program for the opponent, renunciation of the "defended posture" and the "counterforce mission."

Those who value life above all else may see surrender, or swift disarmament, as their best bet. But those who value freedom more than life (without valuing life the less for that, for death is the termination of earthly freedom) may prefer to gamble on some longer-term political program for changing the rules of the Cold War and the rewards of aggression, such as the program here suggested for political unification of the West, prior to any attempt to enforce more drastic sacrifices of sovereign power. Any world view that sees East and West as unripe for brotherhood, yet aims at encouraging some such lofty ultimate tendency, certainly requires time for its implementation. It is time, nothing more and perhaps something less, that deterrence offers the human race.

(Continued from p. 266)

ing the previous proposals. Two years later the negotiations did take place with many of the Western positions paralleling their earlier proposals.

In two respects this delay in the negotiations can be deemed a wasted opportunity. First, the spectacle of a wavering position in the United States created world-wide doubts as to the sincerity of United States advocacy of arms control and disarmament. Second, in 1955, the climate for an East-West negotiation was much better than in 1957 after the Hungarian and the Suez episodes.

It would not be possible within the scope of this article to analyze in detail the reasons underlying the wasted opportunities. It should merely be noted that at no time dur-

ing the 10 years of negotiations did the United States or any of its Western Allies have an adequate organization to work out a sound and detailed program of arms control and to carry on the extensive negotiation essential to implement such a program. At no time during these 10 years was there sufficient continuity in Western and, in particular, in the United States leadership in this field to produce a consistent policy. Finally, and even more important, at no time during this ten-year period was there any apparent over-all plan which placed disarmament and arms control within a broad framework comprehending our entire foreign relations. When on May 10, 1955, the Soviet Union at least ostensibly reversed its previous positions, the United States was unprepared and had no immediate answer.

"... On balance the United States (still profiting partly from its geography) seems to be favored," writes this analyst, pointing out that "In this second stage of the nuclear era the defender generally seems to benefit, and the United States is certainly the defender."

Nuclear Weapons: Russian and American

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THE thermonuclear weapon, and its possible use, overwhelmingly condition the current arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. While it is impossible to write with precision regarding the relationship which results from this fact, main channels can lead to clear thinking on the subject. First we must know the effects of thermonuclear weapons, and what size bombs, in TNT yields, are likely to be used. Second, we must learn to think in terms of thermonuclear delivery systems, with special reference to the vulnerability of the bases and launch sites of these systems. Finally, we must inquire into the doctrines and strategies which may govern the use of these weapons. This brief article cannot do all of these things; we can, however, discuss first the effects of nuclear weapons generally, then against that background we shall assess Soviet-American strategic forces.

The size of a nuclear explosion is expressed in terms of equivalent tons of TNT, usually thousands ("kilo") or millions ("mega"). The first nuclear weapons used at Hiroshima

and Nagasaki were roughly of 20 kiloton size, or equivalent to 20 thousand tons of TNT. Compare this with the largest Soviet explosion of last autumn, reported to have been about 60 megatons, or 60 million tons of TNT. Thus the Russian explosion was three thousand times larger than the Hiroshima bomb. Whatever the size of the explosion, for most detonations there are four ways in which the energy is released. These are the rough proportions: 35 per cent = heat; 50 per cent = blast; 5 per cent = prompt gamma radiation; 10 per cent = radioactive fission products (fallout).¹

Thus the effects of nuclear explosions which kill or injure humans, and destroy or damage property, fall into the three categories of burns, sudden great motion (blast effects), and radiation. It will be useful to discuss each of these effects separately, in order to see at what levels and at what distances from an explosion there are serious consequences.

Dealing first with heat, we can say that the usual level for regarding heat as a serious threat to people is the point at which second-degree burns are caused. Second-degree burns are those with blisters, requiring medical attention. Such burns result when unprotected skin is exposed to more than 7 calories per square centimeter, which is also the level at which a crumpled piece of newspaper will ignite. A nuclear weapon of the Hiroshima size (20-kilotons) can

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¹ U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War* (Summary Analysis of Hearings), 1959, pp. 10-11.

cause such second degree burns as far as 1.7 miles from the point of detonation. Megaton-sized weapons, exploded in the air, have considerably wider effects: for a 1-megaton explosion the distance is nine miles; for a 10-megaton explosion it is 24 miles; and for a 20-megaton weapon the maximum radius of second-degree burns is 32 miles.²

Blast, the second major product of nuclear explosions, is not by itself a significant casualty agent against humans. But its by-products, "crumbling buildings, flying debris, and man himself being thrown about, are certainly significant."³ And most important, the structures that man builds are very sensitive to even moderate levels of blast overpressure. This is usually expressed in terms of pounds-per-square inch (psi) beyond normal atmospheric pressure. The critical number is 5 psi, since an overpressure of 5 pounds per square inch will destroy conventional wooden and brick homes and do considerable damage to brick apartment buildings. This 5 psi blast effect extends as follows for these weapons: 20-kiloton, 1.1 miles; 1-megaton, almost four miles; 10-megaton, more than nine miles; 20-megaton, eleven miles.

The third major effect of nuclear weapons is radiation dosage. This is generally expressed in numbers of *rem* (roentgen equivalent mammal): 200 rem will cause nausea and vomiting, and probably no deaths; 450 rem will kill half the people so exposed within 30 days; 600 rem will cause sickness within four hours to an entire group so exposed, and a very large percentage of deaths soon afterwards. A dosage of 1000 rem would incapacitate all persons exposed within one or two hours, "and all would die very soon thereafter."⁴ Thus the critical point is regarded as a dose of 700 rem; it is lethal. Turning to the effects of a nuclear explosion, we find that the range for this 700-rem level of initial radiation is smaller than either the critical heat or blast effects distance. For a 20-kiloton explosion it is 0.7 mile; 1-megaton, 1.5 miles; and for both the 10-megaton

and 20-megaton explosions the 700-rem level extends to about 2.25 miles from the detonation.

What we have just discussed are all the immediate effects of a nuclear explosion; we have not taken into account the final 10 per cent of the energy released, which results in early (local) and delayed fallout. Fallout takes place when the fireball of a nuclear explosion comes into contact with the earth's surface and draws up enormous quantities of earth. Such a "surface burst" is designed to damage heavy structures or underground installations. In terms of people not in the immediate vicinity, a 10-megaton surface burst (50 per cent fission) would produce a local fallout pattern with this effect: over an area of 2500 square miles all of the people exposed in the open without shelters would obtain a dose of *at least* 450 rem during the first 48 hours.⁵

Projected Casualties in Thermonuclear Wars

We can turn now from the effects of nuclear weapons generally to a discussion of their consequences if used. In 1959, the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy sponsored a study which was based on an hypothetical attack on the continental United States. In this attack a total of 263 nuclear weapons "in 1, 2, 3, 8, and 10-megaton sizes with a total yield of 1446 megatons were detonated on 224 targets. . . ." Based on 1959 population figures the American casualties would have been 22.8 million killed the first day; 25.7 million additional persons fatally injured; and almost 20 million nonfatally injured.⁶ These casualties (50 million dead) total more than one-third of the American people, and this hypothetical attack is "substantially less than the largest that might be experienced in the 1960's."⁷

In order to understand the military forces presently maintained and being built, and to understand the estimates that are made, we should keep this in mind: The two basic variables that determine the effects of an explosion are (1) the size and composition of the megaton-yield, and (2) the environment of the detonation (surface or air-burst, population center or isolated military installation). For example, a recent study considered attacks on the United States with megaton yields of 3,000, 10,000, and 30,000

² U.S. Congress, Hearings, House Committee on Government Operations, *Civil Defense—1961*, 1961, p. 142.

³ *Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War*, *ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁷ Henry Rowen, *National Security and the American Economy in the 1960's*, Study Paper No. 18, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 1960, fn. p. 24.

megatons. We will deal now with the 10,000-megaton attack under the present conditions of very little civil defense, and we will see that the range of consequences depends greatly upon the kinds of targets chosen. Airfields and "soft" missile sites can be effectively neutralized by airbursts, which produce little or no fallout. Protected or "hardened" targets will be seriously affected only by surface bursts and their attendant crater effects, which produce the greatest local fallout.

In the 10,000-megaton attack, using airbursts when soft targets permit, and allocating only one-sixth of the attack to missile sites, about 22 per cent of the American population may die. If five-sixths are allocated to missile sites fatalities increase to about 40 per cent. But if an attacker uses exclusively surface bursts, and devotes 5/6 of these to missile sites, then fatalities increase further to almost 60 per cent. Finally, if the attacker uses surface bursts and allocates only one-sixth of these to missile sites (which are generally located in our sparsely settled West), almost 90 per cent of the American people can be killed.⁸ As we shall see later, the United States now has a program designed to harden and conceal many hundreds of missiles in this country. If an enemy hoped to destroy these he would probably have to launch an attack which would yield at least 10,000-megatons.⁹

A final word ought to be said regarding the vulnerability of the American population, particularly in comparison with the Russian people. We all recognize, of course, that our population is more concentrated (in a few urban centers) than the Russian. The New York metropolitan area, with 12 million, is the most striking example, while a total of 42 million Americans live in our 12 largest urban areas. Nevertheless, the in-

creasing urbanization of the Russian people, plus the enormous fallout effects of nuclear weapons, leads to the conclusion that both countries are roughly comparable in the vulnerability of their population to nuclear attacks of the same size. A 4,000-megaton attack using ground bursts might kill 40 per cent of the people of either nation.¹⁰

There is no question that the nuclear stockpiles necessary to wreak this havoc exist on both sides of the iron curtain. More to the point, of course, is the nature and size of the delivery systems available to both blocs. Moreover, each side must build forces far in excess of the number simply required "to do the job." One reason, of course, is that both sides feel that their security depends not only upon the size of the force that they can initially launch, but upon the forces still remaining after first suffering an attack. This roughly is the distinction between first- and second-strike forces. The other factor which tends to force planners to increase their estimate of required forces is their recognition that many aircraft will not get through, and that many missiles will not reach their targets. Thus it has been estimated that for such a complex mechanism as an ICBM, in order to ensure a 90 per cent probability that one will detonate at a given target, as many as 33 may have to be launched.¹¹

In order to arrive at some understanding of the "balance" which presently exists, we will look first at the size and composition of American strategic forces and then (on the basis of available information) examine Russian capabilities. The first element to be discussed is the aircraft component of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC).

There seems little disagreement that at present SAC includes 1500-1600 bombers. Three aircraft types account for this total: the B-47, B-52, and B-58. The B-58 is the most advanced of the three, while the B-47, which accounts for most of the planes, will be gradually phased out of service. The B-52's, especially in their "G" and new "H" series, are the most important elements of SAC aircraft strength today. At his press conference on March 6, 1962, President Kennedy gave "over 640" as the number of B-52's, a figure which agrees with other estimates.¹² The B-52 is a true long-range

⁸ *Civil Defense—1961*, p. 230.

⁹ Gen. Pierre Gallois, *The Balance of Terror* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), p. 48.

¹⁰ Hugh Everett III and George E. Pugh, "The Distribution and Effect of Fallout in Large Nuclear-Weapons Campaigns," *Operations Research*, v. 7, No. 2, March-April, 1959 quoted in Rowen, *op. cit.*, fn. p. 31. Also see on this count the testimony of Leon Gouré in *Civil Defense—1961*, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

¹¹ An example is used to illustrate this expansion in numbers: if a rocket consists of 5000 components, each with a reliability of 99.95%, and the planners want a 90% probability of hitting the target with one missile, then 33 have to be fired to ensure this probability. *Interavia*, No. 2/1960, p. 155.

¹² See transcript of Presidential press conference, *New York Times*, 7 March, 1962. Also see: *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances, The Military Balance, 1961-1962* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies), p. 8; *The Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 19, 1961; and *Interavia*, No. 1/1962, p. 50.

bomber; it is based in the United States and needs no in-flight refueling. The B-47, on the other hand, ceased production in 1957, and requires the services of a fleet of 450 heavy tankers. Even so, it appears that the B-47 can carry *at least* 10-megatons, and the B-52 no less than 20-megatons. Thus, according to Hans Bethe, who advises the President on nuclear matters, the bombs "which can be carried in planes alone are 20,000 megatons."¹³ The attacks we discussed earlier, it will be recalled, were at levels only of 1400 and 10,000 megatons.

Furthermore, it is most important to remember that the effective range and destructive power of the latest B-52's are greatly increased as a result of two new types of air-to-surface missiles. Each of these bomber-launched missiles is tipped with a nuclear warhead in the range of "several megatons."¹⁴ The first, *Hound Dog*, has a range of 500-600 miles and is already carried in pairs by the B-52-G. The more recent and important air-surface missile, *Skybolt*, has a range of 1100 miles, and when it becomes operational in 1964, it will be carried in quantities of four by each B-52-H.

Skybolt is also an important part of the armament for the B-58, which may be this country's last manned long-range bomber. The B-58 can travel for periods at twice the speed of sound (Mach-2), and it carries five thermonuclear warheads and two *Skybolt* missiles.¹⁵ This remarkable aircraft began coming into service early in 1958,¹⁶ and there are presently about 40 in operation.¹⁷ Recently Defense Secretary McNamara indi-

cated that by 1967 the total of SAC bombers will be somewhat more than 700¹⁸ (it is now 1600 but the B-47's are leaving). From this we can deduce that the full quota of the B-58 will be 100, since over 600 B-52's will stay in service. It would also seem safe to say that the B-58 is produced at about the rate of 10 each year. These two bombers, each armed with *Skybolt* to increase its power and range, will be the backbone of SAC aircraft at least until the end of this decade.

American Strategic Missiles

The impression one gets even from a quick glance at United States missile efforts is one of exceptional variety, numbers and potential invulnerability. And at the outset this writer is inclined to say that there seems to be no glaring "missile gap." There are four classes of American strategic missiles presently in operation or important for the very immediate future: *Atlas*, *Titan*, *Minuteman*, and *Polaris*. The first three are true intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), with ranges from 13,000 miles (*Titan-2*) to 6300 miles (*Minuteman* and *Titan 1*). *Polaris* has a range (1300 miles at present) which puts it into the category of intermediate-range missiles (IRBM), but because it is launched by nuclear-powered submarines located almost anywhere at sea, it is generally numbered along with the ICBM class.

The *Atlas* and *Titan 1* are presently operational in limited numbers, with estimates indicating a total of at least 60 as this article is published. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gilpatric, spoke of "dozens of ICBMS" in October, 1961,¹⁹ and a reliable source states that as of January, 1962, there were 54 *Atlas* and 9 *Titan* already operational from fortified or hardened sites.²⁰ *Atlas* and *Titan* are both very large missiles, apparently designed to carry warheads ranging from 3 to 5 megatons. Both types are now being emplaced in very hard underground "silos" (able to withstand up to 100 psi). The total number planned for these two missiles is a very important goal, and since a variety of responsible sources give very similar estimates in this connection, we feel reasonably confident in stating those numbers here. The best guess seems to be that there will be a total of approximately 230 *Atlas* and *Titan* combined.²¹

¹³ Hans A. Bethe, "Strategy and Disarmament," *Cornell Alumni News*, February, 1962, p. 35.

¹⁴ *Interavia*, No. 3/1961, p. 314.

¹⁵ Congressman Jim Wright, *Letter to the Christian Science Monitor*, 17 June, 1961. For details of the B-58 see "Specifications," *Aviation Week*, 12 March, 1962, p. 179.

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, 2 February, 1958.

¹⁷ *Interavia*, No. 1/1962, p. 50.

¹⁸ A.P. despatches, 15 March, 1962.

¹⁹ *Vital Speeches*, 1 December, 1961, vol. xxviii, no. 4. General Gallois, whose book went to print probably in mid-1961, wrote of 20 *ATLAS* already operational from soft sites (*The Balance of Terror*, *op. cit.*, p. 28).

²⁰ *Interavia*, No. 1/1962, p. 50; No. 12/1961, p. 1618.

²¹ The usual breakdown is about 100 *TITAN* and 130 *ATLAS* (*Interavia*, No. 12/1961, p. 1618. General Gallois writes of 132 *ATLAS* and 96 *TITAN* (*The Balance of Terror*, *op. cit.*, p. 41); and Professor Bethe, assuming a frequent estimate of about 600 *MINUTEMEN* eventually, speaks of about "a thousand invulnerable . . . missiles in a few years" (p. 39, *op. cit.*), which would also imply about 250 *ATLAS* and *TITAN*. Finally, this figure is also supported by the *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 March, 1961, where there is a report of 25 missile clusters building, each to hold 12 *ATLAS* or *TITAN*.

Regarding *Polaris* there is a similar consensus on the numbers now operational and at sea. Each nuclear-powered submarine designed to carry *Polaris* can launch 16 of these missiles. All sources state that there are now at sea six *Polaris*-launching submarines, with a total of 96 of these solid-fueled missiles aboard.²² There is less agreement concerning the number of *Polaris*-firing submarines to be commissioned over the course of the next year,²³ but after late 1963 it seems safe to conclude that commissioning will be at the rate of one each month²⁴ until a total of 41 is reached.²⁵ It is at least clear, however, that this one weapons system alone can launch enormous force.²⁶ If we accept the estimate of Alastair Buchan that by 1965 29 *Polaris* submarines with 364 missiles will be in operation,²⁷ we see that this one system will have an explosive force of at least 180-megatons, packaged in a very protected and well-hidden form.

The last American missile program with which we will deal is the *Minuteman*, in some ways the "darling" of our deterrent for the next ten years. *Minuteman* is relatively small (60 feet long), light (65,000 lbs. compared to *Titan 1*'s 220,000 lbs.) and inexpensive, and packs a warhead of two-megatons each. The first squadron of 50 will be emplaced in a few months. *Minuteman* fits the requirements of a second-strike weapon, in that it is rather readily

protected and hidden and can be produced in enormous numbers. Initial plans called for construction of 600 *Minutemen*, with the first 300 in six squadrons at bases in Utah and South Dakota.²⁸ Recently, however, indications are that the Administration plans to emplace 800 *Minutemen* over the next three years and possibly even more.²⁹ According to one report, productive capacity could turn out as many as 700 each year.³⁰ But the decision on how many *Minutemen* in particular will be produced turns directly on the question of estimates of Russian missile and bomber forces.³¹ There is obviously less agreement on that question than any other touched on in this article. The reader is thus warned that what follows is a brief "guesstimate."

Russian Strategic Aircraft

Russian aircraft are known in the West by their Nato code names, and the three most familiar bombers are the *Bear*, the *Bison*, and the *Badger*. The *Bear*, which is truly long-range (7000 mi.), is a four-engined turbo-prop aircraft. It has recently been re-equipped to carry one air-surface missile, roughly similar to the American *Hound Dog*.³² Estimates vary widely as to its quantity, ranging from 70 to 200.³³ The other familiar heavy bomber, *Bison*, is a four-jet aircraft, which according to some reports is being gradually dropped rather than modified to carry the new air-surface missiles. It seems not to have been shown at the 1961 Soviet Air Show at Tushino in July, 1961.³⁴ Reports generally have given its quantities as 120, so that *Bear* and *Bison* together were estimated at about 200. The third bomber, the twin-jet medium-range *Badger*, is generally conceded to exist in very large quantities, with estimates ranging from 1000-2000.³⁵ Its range may be as great as 4000 miles without re-fueling, and it has been recently equipped with a single air-surface missile and new radome. Finally, the newest addition to the Soviet long-range bomber fleet appears to be the *Bounder*. This craft is roughly similar to but larger than the U.S. B-58, and on account of its high speed "could confront the American air defence with new problems."³⁶ No information is available regarding the number of *Bounders* in operation.

²² *Interavia*, No. 1/1962, p. 50; Speech by Dep. Defense Secretary Gilpatric, in *Vital Speeches*, op. cit.; *Missiles and Rockets*, 12 February, 1962, p. 32; *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances*, op. cit., p. 9.

²³ Three submarines during 1962 according to *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances*, op. cit.; five submarines that year according to the *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 February, 1961.

²⁴ *Missiles and Rockets*, 12 February, 1962, p. 32; *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 February, 1961.

²⁵ Defense Secretary McNamara, AP despatches, 15 March, 1962; *Missiles and Rockets*, 29 January, 1962, p. 17; *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 December, 1961.

²⁶ The size of the POLARIS warhead is reportedly one-half megaton, or 500-kilotons (*Interavia*, No. 3/1961, p. 306).

²⁷ "The Role of NATO," *Interavia*, No. 1/1962, p. 50.

²⁸ *Interavia*, No. 3/1961, pp. 308-09.

²⁹ *New York Times*, 1 March, 1962; *Aviation Week*, 5 March, 1962, p. 73.

³⁰ *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 December, 1961.

³¹ Joseph Alsop, *Nashville Tennessean*, 22 December, 1961.

³² *Aviation Week*, 12 March, 1962, p. 271, says 200; both that these have considerably longer range than the 600-mile US HOUND DOG.

³³ *Aviation Week*, 12 March, 1962, pp. 271, says 200; both *Interavia* and the Institute for Strategic Studies, however, reported the lower figure, as of late 1961.

³⁴ "New Soviet Military Aircraft," *Interavia*, No. 10/1961, pp. 1434-35; No. 11/1961, pp. 1520-1521; *Aviation Week*, 12 March, 1962.

³⁵ Again, the high estimate is given by *Aviation Week*, an American source, and the low figure of 1000 is accepted both by *Interavia* and the Institute for Strategic Studies (London).

³⁶ *Interavia*, No. 10/1961, p. 1435.

It would seem, therefore, that in comparison with the 700 modern SAC bombers (not including the 1,000 B-47's), the Soviet long-range air forces available to penetrate the United States number no more than 150 long-range bombers and 200 medium-range craft—taking into account refueling problems.³⁷

Russian Strategic Missiles

In the recent past the United States seriously over-estimated the size of Soviet ICBM forces. The worst period of the alleged "missile gap," even according to former Defense Secretary Gates in the Eisenhower administration, was expected to occur at the point at which we are now: mid-1962.³⁸ This pessimistic view was based on the apparent ability of the Russians to have produced by now as many as 200 ICBMS. They seem not to have done this, and instead, sources now indicate the number of Russian ICBMS at somewhat higher than 50.³⁹ Very few test firings have been detected, and up to a year ago there was final and absolute confirmation of only two ICBM bases in the Soviet Union,⁴⁰ although as many as ten have been reported. Some of these bases are interestingly located: at Alma-Ata, just off the western border of China; at Okha on Sakhalin Island; near Magnitogorsk, deep in the center of Russia; and at Anadyr, which is not more than 600 miles from Alaska.⁴¹

The "family" of Russian missiles, in contrast to the pattern in the West, is very small. So far as is known publicly, there is only one ICBM type at present, the T-3. This is a very large three-stage, liquid-fueled system with a range of up to 8,000 miles and a thermonuclear warhead of megaton size.⁴² The T-3 is 110 feet long, and weighs about 90 tons;⁴³ these characteristics may have influenced the Kremlin to avoid producing this weapon in significant quantities. For

it would have been extremely difficult and costly to build a concealed base structure for so large and vulnerable a missile.

The two Soviet IRBMS about which there is information available are the T-2, with a weight of 60 tons and a range of 1,800 miles, and the T-4, which is much lighter and has a range of no more than 1,000 miles.⁴⁴ These IRBM missiles are quite properly regarded as a threat to Western Europe, since there may be as many as 200 operational,⁴⁵ and the majority of IRBM sites are in the western and central portions of European Russia. But there are in addition three IRBM bases on Sakhalin Island.

The Balance

There are many kinds of forces, both conventional and nuclear, which this brief survey has not taken into account. We have not discussed, for example, the growing number of Russian submarines, of which a few are nuclear-powered and capable of launching short-range missiles. But we have also not examined the *several thousand* Western aircraft, both land- and sea-based, which are capable of striking at the Soviet Union and its allies with nuclear warheads. And we have ignored the still-gnawing problem of Nato's understrength 22 divisions when 30 are the minimum needed. It is the nuclear striking forces for general war which have occupied our attention, and on balance the United States (still profiting partly from its geography) seems to be favored.

In this second stage of the nuclear era the defender generally seems to benefit, and the United States is certainly the defender. There are already dozens of targets in the continental United States which the Soviet Union would have to neutralize all at once in order to make aggression profitable. Soon there will be hundreds of such targets, and then the Russians will have to consider the use of one ten-megaton weapon to destroy each *Minuteman* site—which carries much less than ten-megatons. Even then there would be no certainty of neutralizing enough of the second-strike. As General Gallois concludes, "the Soviets could still have an arsenal ten times more powerful [than the United States] without possessing the military instruments of victory."

This is the balance of terror.

³⁷ Kendall D. Moll, "Survival in Nuclear War," *Ordnance*, September–October, 1961, p. 207; also *Interavia*, No. 12/1961, p. 1618.

³⁸ *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 January, 1960.

³⁹ *Interavia*, No. 12/1961, p. 1618; *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances*, *op. cit.*, Table II; *The Christian Science Monitor*, 29 December, 1961.

⁴⁰ *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 February, 1961.

⁴¹ *Military Review*, May, 1961, p. 104.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 100–01.

⁴³ Alfred J. Zaehring, "Soviet Rocket Forces," *Ordnance*, September–October, 1961, p. 219.

⁴⁴ *Military Review*, May, 1961, p. 100.

⁴⁵ *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

In an analysis of Soviet pressures upon the United States, this author sums up the predicament for the United States: "We are . . . doubly imperiled by the strong, attractive web of our own ideological outlook. We have concluded not only that the Communist menace is essentially non-military, but also that in the very nature of our system and its outlook we prefer to test our system against Communist challenges in a non-military arena." Is this wise?

American Fears of the Soviet Union

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IT SHOULD be stressed at the outset, and again at the end, that the Western world—and the United States in particular—has a great deal to be alarmed at, even frightened by, as it faces challenges from the centers of Communist power. There are legitimate fears, both real and urgent, to be pressed home. International communism does constitute a menace to our way of life and to our national security—the greatest menace we have had in history.

It borders on the tragic, however, that recognizing the menace seems increasingly the function of patriotism rather than the product of probing questions. It is no longer enough to say that Soviet behavior is not easy to explain. More important, only because it is more governing, such explanations

would be unwise. There is, in the words of Erich Fromm, considerable "paranoid thinking" regarding the Soviet Union in the United States. All of which is merely to register the shallow but telling point that the paranoids are right—now, if not at all times or forever—but probably for the wrong reasons.

But let us go straight to the kernel of the menace. The Soviet Union is alarming because it has now achieved a capacity to counter our nuclear deterrent with deterrents in kind: effective long-range missile delivery systems. Whether theirs, ours, or both systems are comparatively vulnerable or invulnerable are matters of considerable importance, but such issues are overshadowed by what nearly all students of Soviet behavior presently conclude to be the ruling élite's interpretation of the consequences flowing from this Soviet achievement. In essence, they seem to conclude that by countering our threat of nuclear war, the Soviet Union has regained maneuverability and the privilege of indulging in enterprises of boldness.

More recent Soviet efforts to interpret or define "peaceful coexistence," such as the Moscow Declaration in December, 1960, of the World Conference of Communist Parties, have clearly stressed the futility of war between the Great Powers, and a desire to avoid the atomic conflict Russia apparently believes would ensue from such a clash. Indeed, much of its present difficulty with its ally, Communist China, seems to rest precisely on its less adventuresome attitude regarding the threat of nuclear war and the consequence of direct engagement with the

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military forces of the West. It is here that we might best place Marshal Malinovsky's well-advertised "Warning to the West" presented with such deliberate care to the Twenty-Second Communist Congress, Moscow, on October 24, 1961. Boasting of Russia's creation of a strategic rocket force, and of a bountiful surplus of rockets of various types and purposes, the Marshal added that "at present there are in the rocket troops about 1,800 sub-units with a rating of 'excellent,' and these are great masters of their craft, masters of hitting without a miss any point on the globe."

Marshal Malinovsky also said other things, some of considerably less credibility, such as his simple announcement that "the problem of destroying rockets in flight has also been successfully solved." It is not unlikely that the Marshal was trying patiently to advise and to educate, rather than merely to preen or to boast, just as Khrushchev himself has invoked with considerable repetitiveness his observation about recent, revolutionary changes in "the balance of forces." Perhaps they were anxious to make clear to the obtuse anti-Communist world that the American Century—short as it was—is over, and that the sooner this was realized by all, the greater the hope that nuclear war would not develop.

Here rests Louis Halle's analogy of the chess-player outlook of Soviet diplomacy. Only a fool or an ignoramus would threaten nuclear war, or perhaps any war, against a power capable of retaliating in kind, and while the U.S.S.R. may be unable to do much about the possible prevalence of American fools, it is going to do its best to deliver us from ignorance. While we, from our side, might find little of interest in such didacticism, we should concede that one of the great problems of world peace is and will remain the persistent rigidity of official attitudes and outlooks.

Nuclear Chess

It may be idle, but it seems worth pondering in this connection, that the interesting aspect of Khrushchev's rocket statements regarding Cuba was not so much his threat in July, 1960, to employ rockets should the United States try to intervene against Castro, but his later acknowledgment that he in-

voked the rockets primarily in their symbolic meaning. Considering the careful, studied position on nuclear war which has evolved during Khrushchev's regime, it seems clear that its avoidance is a major objective of Soviet policy. There would seem no reason for Khrushchev to have modified his threat, once uttered, except in deference to his own self-acknowledgment of its foolishness. And about the only reason he would have concluded it to be foolish would be his recognition that it could lead him into the folly of initiating nuclear war. One should not simply dismiss as an old wives' tale Mme. Khrushchev's remark to a delegation of disarmament enthusiasts in October, 1961, that "we know that any nuclear war will destroy us all. Therefore we are not building any shelters from bombs or fall-out."

What has been said up to this point is simply to observe the probability that one of the feed-back consequences of the Soviet effort to build a counter-deterrent to the American system of deterrence—leading to what is so familiarly described in the literature as the "balance of terror"—has been a self-intimidation over the consequences of atomic war. If, however, this is Point "A" in the alphabet of a balance of terror world, "B" would seem to emerge from the mutuality of interest in avoiding a nuclear holocaust: an arms control agreement increasing the protection of each from the temptations, miscalculations, and other pressures of the other. But "B" has not emerged, nor is there much prospect of its doing so, for the Soviet Union apparently has concluded that "A" can do as much for "B" as "B" can do for itself—by tacit understanding, and without the troublesome accoutrements demanded by "B". Indeed, it should be seriously doubted whether to this day the Soviet Union has ever taken the slightest interest in disarmament proposals, *qua* disarmament proposals, or has found them of any merit whatsoever except as a potent and useful instrument of political warfare, or as a trap to waylay unwary American military power.

It may well become the irony—perhaps the tragic irony—of the age of nuclear deterrence that the Soviet Union has deduced that the second main consequence of its own arrival as a counter-deterrent power is that the West now has to be more cautious in its

response to the aggressive moves of international communism. The ultimate result of the balance of terror, while in one important sense most sobering and restraining, has been to encourage the Soviet Union to take more risks, to be more aggressively adventuresome with respect to opportunities that do not strike at the heart of Western power and security.

All of this has permitted even the more cautious men of the Kremlin to stir with greater zest and enthusiasm the cauldrons of revolution and civil strife throughout the underdeveloped world. This, according to Richard Lowenthal in a recent article in *Encounter*, is what the Soviet Union means by "peaceful coexistence." While implying the prevention of war between sovereign states, and ruling out nuclear or thermo-nuclear war, "it cannot and should not prevent civil wars or 'just wars of liberation' arising from popular insurrections, which are inevitable as long as imperialism exists." Or, to continue with Lowenthal's telling interpretation of Soviet reasoning, "on the contrary, 'peaceful coexistence' is justified as creating the most favorable conditions for the development of such revolutionary wars."¹

There is very little of greater importance to be said to the people of the non-Communist world, particularly to Americans, about the real—as against the imagined—threat of the Soviet Union in these days of the balance of terror than to clarify the implications of Russia's erection of a counter-deterrent to American atomic power and missile delivery systems. In part, at least, the threat derives from the tendency on the part of significant groups of Americans to assume that since leadership in the Soviet Union has finally gotten around to recognizing the horrors of nuclear war, and since there has emerged a general consensus that the Soviet Union is convinced of the necessity of avoiding such a war, then a cooperative era of constructive peaceful coexistence is ready for launching and awaits only the removal of bigoted anti-Communists from positions of influence in the United States. One might have reservations about the usefulness, if not the inten-

tions, of bigoted anti-Communists, but the drama of their behavior has tended to obstruct a clearer recognition of the logic of Soviet behavior.

There is, as briefly alluded to before, an added incentive moving the Soviet Union toward a more actively disruptive role in world affairs, having to do with its present quarrels with Communist China. Philip Mosely has noted that the "Sino-Soviet rivalry may be placing stronger pressures and setting more urgent deadlines for a Moscow-sponsored expansion of Communism." And as Mosely observed: "Far from handicapping Soviet ambitions in Southeast Asia, the contest between Moscow and Peking may lead Khrushchev to take greater risks than in the past in order to demonstrate that his policy of graduated risks is both more fruitful and less dangerous than Peking's emphasis on all-out 'revolutionary zeal.'"²

It is reassuring to note that there is considerable alertness in official American circles as to the nature of the Soviet threat as indicated above, and to the current Khrushchevian interpretation of the "liberation war" theory that it embodies. A major policy speech made in Chicago on February 17, 1962, by United States Defense Secretary Robert McNamara was specifically directed to this interpretation and to the meaning for the United States of the ensuing Soviet threat.

U.S. Policy Shift

Secretary McNamara revealed an unusual interest in Khrushchev's speech at the meeting of the Soviet Communist Party Organizations on January 6, 1961, even to the point of remarking that the "liberation war" theory in that speech "might well be one of the most important policy declarations in the '60's by any world leader." In full consonance with the interpretation presented by Lowenthal, Mosely and others, McNamara noted Khrushchev's position that a major war in the nuclear age has become too dangerous to be "the midwife to revolution." McNamara added that the "Russians wanted to keep the threat of nuclear war alive as a means of intimidation and blackmail to discourage the free world from resisting communism in 'wars of liberation.'"

¹ Richard Lowenthal, "The Dangerous Year," *Encounter*, June, 1961, p. 62.

² Philip E. Mosely, "Khrushchev's Party Congress," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1962, p. 194.

All of this, of course, was prefatory to the announcement that there had been a shift in military thinking in the United States, a shift toward building up non-nuclear forces that would provide flexibility and, as the Secretary put it, a "wider range of practical alternatives." What we were doing, in sum, was reacting to the recognition of an urgent need to be able to respond—militarily—in the "twilight zone" between combat and political subversion. As a recent important article in the *Marine Corps Gazette* suggested, events in Southeast Asia, in Africa, and in the Caribbean seem to bear out the prediction that the 1960's "may be the decade of the guerrilla." Subsequent evidence of a considerable—if unspecified—commitment of American military support in South Vietnam was the first indication of any effort to implement the new policy, just as Vietnam has been undoubtedly one of the first pressing examples of the need for such a new policy.

It will be difficult, nonetheless, for the United States to adjust to the new situation, and not least because we have been conditioned to see the Soviet threat as having passed from the military sphere into the economic, propaganda, and political spheres. In the minds of responsive Americans, the challenge of "peaceful coexistence" has largely become a kind of competitiveness. Short of a major technological breakthrough in military matters, first the check of atomic superiority and then the checkmate of nuclear parity, led Americans to view the Communist menace in terms of real but non-military offensives. These remain real enough, but their significance has perhaps already been overshadowed by the return of an insidious military threat. With the launching of so many new nations, underdeveloped, unviable, insecure, and yet ambitious, this will increasingly become the age not only of the balance of terror, but also of instability. Instability spells opportunity for international communism, and the Khrushchevian interpretation of opportunity will be to support, covertly but actively, local war.

This is not an appealing premise because it concludes that the prime threat of international communism is neither philosophic (ideological) or economic (material), but military. The Soviet Union, for all its com-

petence as a nuclear and non-nuclear power, is not likely to mount an aggressive war against the United States; it surely has too much respect for American military power. But by its counter-deterrent it has recreated the terms under which force can be invoked to take advantage of instability, and even to push it along. These terms include the presumption that the West has an added reluctance to meet the challenge of local war out of fear that it would not remain local or non-nuclear.

To this bleak point must be added the predicament of our built-in reluctance even to acknowledge the military challenge, let alone to face it. The threat of nuclear war has dominated our concept of the resort to force, and has led us to conclude that the Soviet Union—however otherwise vicious or mischievous—shares our hesitancy to resort to military means. If this is not enough to cause concern, one should also note that we are by nature and ideological bent inclined to cheer the arrival of the "revolution of rising expectations" among the predominant majority, the underdeveloped nations of the world. We might also reflect on the advice of not a few of our more frank experts to the effect that its most dangerous facet is that the revolution will simply fail to satisfy these expectations.

It tends to sound almost defeatist, but it should nonetheless be suggested that for large and important parts of the world neither democracy, economic aid, technical assistance, alliances, or much else can for the while compete with the population explosion. A great deal can and must be done in these categories, and in large measure by us, but in the circumstances of increasing population pressure, political instability, and economic dependence, our aid will not always meet the challenge of international communism—particularly an international communism armed with the Khrushchevian theory of liberation war.

We are, I think, doubly imperiled by the strong, attractive web of our own ideological outlook. We have concluded not only that the Communist menace is essentially non-military, but also that in the very nature of our system and its outlook, we prefer to test

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In a discussion of Soviet attitudes toward the United States, this specialist declares that "The Communist party absolutely needs the world of violent conflict which its theory presupposes. . . . It may be necessary to avoid going over the brink of war, but international tensions must be maintained; relaxation of tensions may be good as a slogan, but only to show that the malevolence of imperialism always frustrates the efforts of the Soviet Union." What are the implications of this policy for fruitful disarmament negotiations?

Soviet Fears of the West

By G. F. HUDSON

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IT is a decade and a half now since Winston Churchill described Soviet policy as "a mystery wrapped in an enigma." Many political commentators in the West still regard it—its basic motives as distinct from its tactical moves on any given issue—as essentially mysterious. This is because they are unable, or do not try, to imagine how the world looks through the eyes of a Marxist-Leninist. In 1917, political power was captured in Russia by a group of men who held very definite views on the nature of human society and what should be done about it. Since then all children in Russia have been brought up to share these views and no contrary opinions have been tolerated; today the vast majority of those who hold positions of authority have been indoctrinated in the faith since adolescence.

It is only to be expected that the actions of the Russian government in its relations with other countries should reflect the beliefs on which the regime is founded and by which its leaders justify their tenure of dictatorial power. Proceeding on this assumption, we

find indeed that the general pattern of Russian behavior in world affairs becomes intelligible, although the tactical handling of any dispute is often incalculable and full of surprises; that this should be so is again a consequence of the basic character of the regime, for its totalitarian secretiveness enables it to plan its moves in an impenetrable seclusion while the decisions of the Western democracies have to be taken in a glare of public controversy and press publicity.

In February, 1946, after the State Department had asked the American Embassy in Moscow for an explanation of an ominous speech by Stalin calling for a huge arms program "to guarantee our country against any eventuality," George Kennan, then Chargé d'Affaires at the Embassy, produced an analysis of the Soviet system and its policies, which in spite of the changes which have since taken place in Russia, remains today as relevant as when it was written. After pointing out that Soviet official propaganda at that time (less than a year after Germany's surrender) was entirely at variance with the obvious facts of international relations, Kennan declared that this indicated "that the Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of the situation beyond Russia's borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner Russian necessities which existed before the recent war and exist today."

Kennan saw Russia as a country in which no balanced equilibrium of social forces had

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ever been attained; it had been governable only by despotic force, the tradition of which the Bolsheviks had inherited and intensified. The doctrine of revolutionary Marxism, which "had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe," had taken hold of Russia because only there could a dogma of "insoluble social conflict" be accepted. But since the proletarian revolution, victorious in Russia, had not spread over Western Europe and the rest of the world, the new regime still confronted the outer world with the same sense of inner instability and insecurity which had beset the Russia of the Tsars.

"Russian rulers," wrote Kennan, "have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between the Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned the truth about the world without or if foreigners learned the truth about the world within."

Kennan may have exaggerated the continuity between Tsarist and Soviet Russia but he was right in calling attention to a traditional Russian attitude of fear and suspicion of the West which long antedated Lenin. This fear was not primarily one of military aggression; Russia had, after all, engulfed the armies of Charles XII and Napoleon, and could face any purely military threat from the West with a fair degree of confidence. The apprehension was rather that of someone who finds himself at close quarters with a person suffering from a highly infectious disease.

Russian Pan-Slav writers used to describe the West as decadent and "rotten," just as Soviet writers are accustomed to do in our time, but the Russian people, unless carefully protected from the contagion, seemed extremely susceptible to these corrupt influences. To judge from the trouble taken by the Soviet authorities to jam foreign radio broadcasts and prevent the circulation of unauthorized foreign books and periodicals, the Russian people (or peoples) are no more immune to such poisons today than they were in the age of Nicholas I.

Theoretically, of course, there is a vast difference. In the nineteenth century even the defenders of the Russian autocracy had to admit that liberalism was a growing force and that the trend of the times was against them. But the Communists believe that history is on their side, that their total victory throughout the world is predetermined and inevitable, that—again to quote Kennan—the outside world is "evil, hostile and menacing, but destined to be racked with growing internal convulsions until it is given the final *coup de grâce* by the rising power of socialism." All should therefore be well, and Russia need only wait for the capitalist world to collapse. But meanwhile, despite the vision of future triumph, anxiety springs up anew, for serpents keep on finding their way into the communist Garden of Eden and destroying the innocence of its inhabitants.

The Berlin Threat

Berlin has been the most scandalous example of the threat which the West continues to present to the Soviet system, for instead of East Germany being to West Germany, and particularly to West Berlin, a shining example of the new society to gather all Germans into the Soviet orbit, the seduction has been the other way round. Ulbricht has had to build his wall to prevent the mass emigration of his citizens to the land of bourgeois decadence—or at least their excursions to view in the shops of the capitalist enclave the consumer goods which they cannot buy in their own more virtuous world. It is not the military threat of West Berlin which has been the "bone in the throat" for the Soviet bloc—for nobody can pretend that a small, weak garrison of troops of the Western powers 100 miles within the former Soviet occupation zone of Germany could seriously menace the military might of Russia and her satellite allies—but the channel of political contact which remained as long as one could pass through the iron curtain by walking along a Berlin street.

In the original apocalyptic revolutionary Marxism revived by Lenin—as distinct from the modified Marxism of the Social Democrats—the world was seen as torn by a basic conflict only to be resolved through violence. The *Communist Manifesto* of 1847 declared that its aims "can only be achieved by the

violent overthrow of the whole contemporary social order." This violence was to be the counterpart of that used by the bourgeoisie to maintain its system of exploitation. It was taken for granted that governments controlled by capitalism would do everything possible to crush the Socialist revolution, so that its accomplishment would involve civil war, and probably international war as well, as in the struggles which followed the French Revolution of 1789. In this conception of the future there was no place for peaceful adjustments or compromises, except as temporary expedients, nor was there any clear distinction to be drawn between offensive and defensive action; the world was a jungle in which revolutionaries were trying to destroy the enemy and the enemy was trying to destroy them.

Lenin's theory of imperialism, taking the First World War as its illustration, developed the idea that war was a necessary outcome of the capitalist system; bourgeois states either fought each other in rivalry for markets and colonies or they combined against a Socialist country, as in the Allied interventions in Russia in 1918-1920. Later on the rise of fascism and the second world war appeared to confirm the theory. But the results of the two world wars were held also to confirm the thesis that the Communist revolution was historically destined to prevail. *Pravda*, in 1947, claimed that the first of these wars, by bringing about the revolution in Russia had made "the first break in the imperialist chain," and that the second, by the emergence of Communist-governed states in Eastern Europe, had inflicted "a new serious defeat on the capitalist world."

Down to the Twentieth Party Congress of 1956 no Communist was permitted to doubt either that "imperialism" would sooner or later launch a new war against the Soviet Union or that it was right and proper for Communists to extend their power territorially by force whenever a good opportunity offered itself. Lenin in 1920 had declared that "as long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism." And in 1918 Lenin had written: "If war is waged by the proletariat after it has conquered the

bourgeoisie in its own country, with the object of strengthening and extending socialism, such a war is legitimate and 'holy.'"

A Communist leader should indeed be prudent and cautious; he should not engage in reckless adventures; he should enter into agreements with the enemy to gain time whenever conditions are unfavorable for a forward policy. But when opportunity offers, it is his duty to make all possible gains for communism, as Stalin did in Eastern Europe in 1939 and again in 1945.

For fully convinced and dedicated Communists the thought of advance and expansion, of riding ahead on the wave of the future, was naturally foremost, but for the masses of the Russian people the danger from foreign enemies was emphasized. The sentiments of patriotism were invoked where devotion to the cause of communism was lacking. Between 1920 and 1939, all the resources of propaganda were used to build up the picture of a Russia surrounded by predatory, hostile powers, and the opposition Communists doomed to death by Stalin were made to confess to having plotted to dismember the Soviet Union for the benefit of imperialist robbers.

The actual invasion of Russia by the Germans in 1941 and the horrors that accompanied it naturally made a profound and lasting impression on the ordinary Soviet citizen, and when after the elimination of German power four years later he was told that the United States had taken the place of Hitler's Third Reich as the threat to Russia's independence, he could hardly, in the absence of any dissenting voice within his country, avoid giving some credence to the idea; this idea was strengthened when he heard that the Western powers were re-arming their part of Germany.

As far as Russia's Communist leaders were concerned, it is impossible historically to maintain that their main preoccupation in the post-war period was with a possible resurgence of German militarism, for the West offered Russia a four-power treaty guaranteeing the demilitarization of the German state for 25 years. Stalin rejected it, preferring to build up Communist armed formations in East Germany and incite Germans against the West. The Russian people, however, remained in ignorance of all this, having no

sources of information but their own government's publicity, and were undoubtedly deeply alarmed at the news that the army which had swept over their country to the Neva and the Volga was again in being. Communist propaganda has made the most of this fear inside Russia, and abroad has endeavored to spread the idea that Moscow's policies since 1945 have never had any other purpose than to provide Russia with security against a German *revanche*.

Peaceful Coexistence

It is only during the last five years that these Russian hopes of expansion and fear of being attacked have been seriously modified by the propagation of the concept of peaceful coexistence. It is true that the idea had already been put forward by Stalin, who in the autumn of 1946 talked to a British journalist of friendly competition between the capitalist and Communist social systems. But such declarations at that time do not appear to have had more than a passing tactical significance.

It was in the situation which arose after Stalin's death that the concept came to have real ideological importance. In the first place Stalin's tough foreign policy, culminating in the blockade of Berlin and Soviet-sponsored aggression in Korea, had united the West in resistance to Russian expansion, leading to the formation of the Nato alliance and the large-scale rearmament of the Western powers. Russia could no longer profit from mortal divisions within the non-Communist world, as in the Hitler period, and was faced with a formidable opposition and the danger of a war without a major ally. Further, the introduction of strategic nuclear weapons had made resort to arms so mutually destructive that it was to be avoided by a Communist no less than by a capitalist state.

The conclusion drawn by Khrushchev from this situation was that the time had come to embark on a new kind of diplomacy characterized by summit conferences, state visits abroad, direct appeals to foreign peoples and calls for the "relaxation of international tensions." If truculence and threats had brought Nato into being, might not a show of conciliation dissolve it again? If full-scale war was now too terrible to be

contemplated, would it not be better to accept the fact and confine the struggle of the ideologies to the political and economic fields? Khrushchev was temperamentally an optimist with a great faith in his own diplomatic skill; he seems to have believed that he could talk Western statesmen out of their positions and that he had only to appear in person in Britain and the United States in order to rally the great volume of popular pro-Soviet feeling which he assumed to exist. Further, the rate of economic growth in the Soviet Union in the post-war years had been so great as to fill his sanguine spirit with the thought of soon overtaking and surpassing even the United States, so that violence in the competition of the social systems would be superfluous; communism would win simply because it would be manifestly superior as a form of economic organization.

If such was the state of mind in which Khrushchev approached issues of foreign policy between the Geneva conference of 1954 and the abortive Paris summit of 1960, there were two factors which denied him success. In the first place, the Western powers after their bitter experience since 1945 were not disposed to lower their guard without some evidence that the course of Soviet policy had really changed, some demonstration that Moscow was now ready to negotiate on a give-and-take basis. But it was just this evidence that Khrushchev never provided; on the contrary, from the time when he committed himself to upsetting the *status quo* in Berlin he demanded a retreat of the Western powers on an issue which they regarded of vital importance without an offer of any Russian concessions in return. Khrushchev may have underestimated the Western will to resist such demands; in any case he tried to make gains of a kind which cannot normally be won except through decisive victory in war.

Why, if he really believed in peaceful coexistence and wanted to achieve a settlement with the Western powers, did he so far overreach himself? The answer is to be sought in the other factor conditioning his policy—the attitude of those upper strata of the membership of the Communist party which constitute the only effective "public opinion" in Russia.

The Views of Russia's Elite

Real power in Russia resides in the small oligarchy of full-time and part-time Party officials, who form a tightly disciplined group of men, deeply indoctrinated in Marxist-Leninist principles, with a compelling vested interest in the perpetuation of their own authority and privileges. These men collectively control not only the state administration, but the entire economic system, all cultural and economic activities and to an extraordinary extent even the private lives of the population over which they rule. They conceive of themselves, in accordance with the doctrine they profess, as an organized revolutionary vanguard engaged not only in creating a new society but in an irreconcilable struggle against internal and foreign enemies.

But suppose there are no longer any enemies at home, and externally permanent peace is assured; what justification then would there be for the Party's monopoly of power and how long would the people continue to submit to it? This is the question which must instinctively be asked by the professional organizers and propagandists of the Party, and from their point of view there can only be one answer. The Communist party absolutely needs the world of violent conflict which its theory presupposes; without it there would have to be a kind of spiritual demobilization ending in disintegration and collapse. It may be necessary to avoid going over the brink of war, but international tensions must be maintained; relaxation of tensions may be good as a slogan, but only to show that the malevolence of imperialism always frustrates the efforts of the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev is the leader of the Soviet Communist party, but he is also in a sense its prisoner. The functioning of the Party requires a strong personal authority at its head, and the party officialdom is ready to accept this, but on one tacit condition: that his acts do not impair the Party's exclusive power. Further, a Party leader is expected either to gain great diplomatic victories in foreign affairs or to show his Marxist-Leninist spirit by his intransigence. For Khrushchev the Party's expectations have been particularly embarrassing, for he is the heir to Lenin and Stalin. It is no easy task to live

up to the standards of success set by Lenin, who created the Soviet Union, and Stalin, who extended its power westward to within 100 miles of the Rhine. Khrushchev has addressed himself to the relatively modest task of capturing West Berlin.

By his repudiation of Stalin's methods of rule at the Twentieth Congress Khrushchev undoubtedly increased his popularity with the Party officials, for he thus gave guarantees against a revival of those procedures of arbitrary arrest and execution which had made their lives so insecure in the days of his predecessor. But at the same time he diminished his own power to coerce the Party and increased his dependence on the voluntary support of the Party *élite*. He can still by his control of the Party machine manage congresses and pack committees, but he can no longer remove anyone he dislikes by having him shot or sent to Kolyma, and he must take notice if there is strong opposition behind the scenes to his policies. He performs before an audience which, despite its formal subservience, is sceptical of his new-fangled ideas and waiting to see whether he can deliver the goods.

Khrushchev came nearest to success in his foreign policy with his talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David, and he seems to have convinced himself for the time being that he had persuaded the American government to abandon Berlin. But subsequent statements in Washington showed that he was after all unlikely to obtain control of Berlin at the pending summit conference, and he was faced with the prospect of a diplomatic failure which might fatally impair his prestige inside the Soviet Union. From this situation he extricated himself by skillful exploitation of the U-2 incident.

He did not, of course, have to give it any publicity; no such news can ever be printed in the Soviet press except by the will of the government. If Khrushchev had expected the Paris conference to be a success for him, the U-2 incident would have remained as unknown as many other events of the secret espionage game in which both sides engage. But by making it an affair of honor and working up a fine theatrical indignation, he created a tactical situation in which he would either get a public apology from the Presi-

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"In a 'world in which the professed common American and Russian aims of general disarmament were realized,' writes this historian, 'The cold war and a host of other disputes would persist and we must therefore give thought to the ways in which we would defend our interests in such a world.' What then would be the 'pattern of politics'?"

Political Settlements and Arms Control

By LAURENCE W. MARTIN

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THE extent to which settlement of major political issues in the cold war is possible may affect the prospects for arms control or disarmament in a number of ways. There is, in the first place, a widely held theory that arms and the arms race are symptoms of political tension and that the solution of political questions is therefore a necessary prerequisite for disarmament. In other words, nations cannot be expected to surrender the means before they have either achieved or abandoned the end. It is only a continuation of this argument to suggest that, given an adjustment of political differences, a reduction in armaments might follow spontaneously. This view doubtless underestimates the inherent momentum of modern military technology but, given human nature, it seems reasonable to assume that lower levels of tension would result in greater readiness to entertain agreements on armaments, though, paradoxically, some of the urgency for such agreements might then have evaporated.

Political settlement and arms control are

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closely linked for the further reason that all measures of control will inevitably have political consequences. Some schemes, such as those for demilitarization or disengagement, frequently call for immediate and explicit political adjustments. Any major manipulation of the instruments by which policy is conducted, however, will have implications for future political relations, and these will provide both dangers and opportunities. A measure of arms control that made strategic bases obsolete, for example, would open up new possibilities for the neutralization of many areas. On the other hand, any limitation on the use of armed force might afford opportunities for increased subversion and revolutionary activity. General disarmament would, of course, do the most to raise a wide range of political problems, though this prospect has been very largely ignored in public discussion.

If particular schemes for political settlement are to be correctly assessed, it is first necessary to consider the general consequences of believing such settlements possible and of actually entering into negotiations.

Quite apart from any substantive results that may arise from negotiating, there is, of course, a certain advantage to be secured merely by avoiding the appearance of being unreasonable. A reputation for sincere effort to resolve differences amicably may win respect from neutrals and strengthen resolution among the peoples of the Western alliance by reassuring them that all possibilities

of compromise have been explored. Excessive readiness to negotiate when there is little hope of success may, however, have the dangerous effect of conferring undeserved respectability on Communist demands and of encouraging an attitude of "peace at any price." If statesmen encourage false hopes of settlement and then draw back at the last minute, then there is further danger of sharp public disillusionment and a consequent rise rather than fall in international tensions.

Limits of Negotiation

To steer a wise course between the extremes of excessive faith or lack of faith in the possibility of reaching negotiated settlements thus calls for high statesmanship. If this is in large part intuitive, it may yet be strengthened by a clear view of the limits of negotiation. A reasonably stable political settlement can be achieved only by discovering arrangements reasonably compatible with the interests of the nations involved. Mere negotiation cannot create such a coincidence of interest where none exists. It can, however, occasionally discover the outline of a possible compromise by illuminating hitherto neglected circumstances and, in particular, by revealing the price each side sets on the interests involved. A typical way in which compromise emerges is by introducing longer-term considerations into a calculation that had proved insoluble when only immediate factors were weighed.

In this sense, negotiation is an exercise in international "understanding." Like all such exercises, it is a two-edged sword. It may sometimes reveal hidden elements of compromise. Equally, it may discover unsuspected grounds for conflict. But even such an unpleasant discovery is a sounder basis for policy than continued misapprehension. So long as we have pretensions to rationality, we must seek to master facts; not to hope that both sides will continue to overlook them.

The surprise and chagrin with which Western opinion frequently greets the collapse of negotiations reflects a very deep underlying conviction that compromise is always possible. As a peculiarly American and British characteristic, this conviction may derive from that "mercantile or shop-

keeper" theory of diplomacy that Sir Harold Nicolson has described as "based upon the assumption that a compromise between rivalries is generally more profitable than the complete destruction of the rival. That negotiation is not a mere phase in a death-struggle, but an attempt to reach some durable understanding."

But in a more general sense the belief in compromise is an intellectual hangover from an earlier age, only partly applicable to the present scene. For long periods in the past it was reasonable to conceive of nations as divided by specific issues. It was possible to eliminate some of these quarrels and thus reduce the degree of hostility among the nations concerned. Theoretically it was even possible to imagine clearing up all the points at issue between them. Sometimes, as in the case of the Anglo-French agreements of 1904, this was actually done, at least to a degree sufficient to put relations on a new footing and open the way for future cooperation.

Such a model of international politics may still apply to relations between many states today, but it is utterly inappropriate to dealings between Communist powers and the West. Communists, so long as they remain Communists, are compelled by doctrine to regard Western nations as enemies and nothing the West can do, short of adopting communism, can alter this. Any settlement with the Communist nations, then, can, in their eyes, only be an incident in the struggle, just as their term "peaceful coexistence" is, as they quite frankly avow, merely the name for a certain type of conflict. Full political disengagement from communism, in the sense of abstaining from a struggle for political supremacy, is thus impossible by definition for communism is permanently engaged with us.

The danger of refusing to face this fact is not so much that we will attempt specific disengagements that leave areas open to Communist penetration. This pitfall should be sufficiently obvious to avoid. Rather the danger lies in forgetting that, because the struggle is enduring, disengagement at one place or agreement to eliminate a particular mode of conflict, such as major war, can only be a decision to translate the contest to other areas or to pursue it by other

means. Failure to recognize this will not facilitate settlements; rather it will expose them to destructive criticism and early collapse.

None of this means that the quest for political settlements is vain or deluded. Though the struggle with communism may be enduring, it is possible that there may be specific points at which the struggle can be temporarily adjourned. There may be particular levels of conflict, such as thermonuclear war, at which we can devise methods of realizing a common interest in preventing an uncontrollable outcome fatal to all. The long-range timetable of Communist ambitions makes temporary detente conceivable. Moreover, some Russian demands, like those concerning German nuclear weapons, seem to arise from genuine fears and these therefore have real bargaining value. Nor should we allow realization of the all-pervasive nature of Communist hostility to provoke us into such a rigid resistance that we cannot even abandon policies or positions that no longer serve our interests.

A European Settlement

The area in which the confrontation between East and West is sharpest and where schemes for settlement have been most agitated is Central Europe. Here the dangers are obvious: the restlessness of the Germans under partition; the desire of West Germany—and of the people of the Eastern Zone—for unity in freedom, and the anxiety of the Communists to stabilize their own gimcrack regime and, ultimately, undermine that of the West. The United States and the Soviet Union have invested a great deal of prestige in this area because of its strategic and symbolic significance, so that the smallest indication of a success for either side is dangerously magnified in the eyes of all. Finally, the illogicalities of the situation in Berlin offer constant opportunities for an explosion arising from simple accident or from one side's miscalculation of the other's reactions.

Possible solutions for the problems of Central Europe fall into two categories: those that call for a political settlement proper, and those merely envisaging a partial disengagement leaving fundamental political allegiances at least initially unchanged.

A true political solution involves an approach to the reunification of Germany, and this would itself immediately raise a further set of problems concerning the relation of this new Germany to its neighbors, particularly in the East. Unification appears well down the agenda of practical propositions at the moment, for the West cannot settle for less than a solution providing, by some such device as free elections, for the freedom of the whole while the Soviet Union for its part could hardly accept a scheme that did not guarantee continuance of its regime in the East and preclude a united Germany from joining the Western alliance. Actually, the plans so far proposed by the West would, in fact if not in theory, produce just such a Western orientation. For the moment then, unification seems conceivable only in terms of victory for East or West, and neither musters sufficient leverage to get its way.

Interest therefore centers on more limited schemes for disengagement. A great many such schemes are propounded—Mr. Michael Howard quotes authority that there are 172 different plans. These involve a variety of areas from narrow zones along the East-West demarcation line to the whole of Central Europe and beyond. There is a similarly wide range of proposals as to the measures that might be taken within these zones, from mere mutual inspection of forces or establishment of warning systems, to a thinning out of forces, both nuclear and conventional, and the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the zones, including a ban on manufacture, as in the Rapacki Plan of 1957. Coming closer to a political readjustment are the proposals for the withdrawal of foreign forces leaving only indigenous troops of whom the most important would necessarily be German. In no case have the Communists yet offered a scheme that the West has thought acceptable either in effectiveness of inspection or equitability of the strategic sacrifices imposed on each side.

The attractions of such schemes are usually declared to be one or more of the following results: (1) that such agreement would be an important symbol of relaxation in tension, (2) that it would constitute a useful pilot scheme for wider arms control, giving experience in negotiating agreements, refining

procedures, gaining confidence in them, and practicing East-West cooperation in working the needed machinery; (3) that the schemes calling for limitations on nuclear weapons, especially those keeping them out of German and other Central European hands, would be an added safeguard against those powers using nuclear weapons to drag the Great Powers into a conflict they do not seek and, further, that denial of nuclear weapons to local commanders of any nationality would reduce such risk of unauthorized use as may survive existing control measures, with consequent reduction in the risk of escalation; (4) that schemes for withdrawal of foreign forces would conduce to greater autonomy on the part of the Soviet satellites; a hope that permeated George Kennan's famous Reith lectures.

These objectives are highly appealing and there can be no doubt that if the Soviet Union shows revived interest, as it seemed to be doing early in March, 1962, it will strike a responsive note in Western and uncommitted countries. If we are to approach such proposals constructively we therefore need to examine the risks involved.

In the first place it seems highly improbable that Russia can seriously entertain a scheme offering real prospects of independence to Eastern Europe and particularly East Germany. Assuming such readiness, there remains a doubt as to whether it would truly relax tension or whether the drive for independence might so far exceed Russia's expectations as to provoke renewed Russian intervention that, even if it did not arouse a violent Western response, would set the cause of arms control and stabilization back rather than forward.

Secondly, it must be asked whether the withdrawal of the Great Powers might not lead to an increase in disturbing incidents within the evacuated zone, once it became possible to pursue conflicts without immediately and obviously invoking the shadow of great nuclear forces. There is, in fact, a strong case to be made for regarding the direct confrontation of the two great thermo-nuclear powers as a stabilizing influence making the catastrophic consequences of a clash obvious.

Thirdly, it is claimed that withdrawal of Nato forces from Germany would make

effective deployment of the forces impossible, and that the use of nuclear weapons in forward areas is essential to Nato strategy. These arguments are not wholly convincing given the retention of West German divisions in Germany and the possibility of launching nuclear weapons from a distance even for tactical purposes. Moreover the problem of deployment, though naturally distasteful to planners who have worked for years on another basis, would almost certainly prove to be within the bounds of military and diplomatic ingenuity.

More serious is a fourth objection, that such schemes are fatal to German morale. Many with a claim to understand German opinion declare that such redeployment would be regarded as preparatory to abandonment, that it would finally destroy the illusion that a war could be fought to the east of West Germany, and that any scheme, however elaborate, that denied Germans nuclear weapons would be resented as clearly discriminatory.

A number of the less ambitious schemes for thinning out or inspecting forces might escape these objections. Unfortunately it is not clear that they would have much effect. Nor is it obvious that practice with such limited schemes in a confined area would be really relevant experience for tackling the wider problems of arms control. Clearly the Soviet Union would feel very differently about such inspection and the thorough penetration of its homeland.

One possibility that has never been canvassed would be to reverse the order of the usual proposals and arrange for *German* disengagement, leaving a "demilitarized" zone manned only by Soviet and American forces. If this zone included the routes to Berlin it might contribute to solution of that vexed question. In any case such a scheme would have several things to recommend it: it would make even clearer the confrontation of the Great Powers and thus discourage adventures; it would eliminate the possibility of a clash between local forces; it would, if the forces in the zone were without nuclear weapons, help to prevent unauthorized use; and it could hardly be construed, even by the Germans, as an American abandonment of Germany. On the contrary, it would symbolize the commitment as never before.

The scheme need not necessarily deny Germany nuclear weapons, but if the Russians made this part of their price, the West would be in a stronger moral position to impose it on West Germany than under any existing proposal. And it must be recognized that if Germany secures nuclear weapons, she will also gain a veto power over all future plans for wider measures of nuclear disarmament, and could, in turn, use this to block further schemes for settlement in Central Europe.

Berlin

Admittedly the chances of agreeing upon this or any other ambitious scheme of disengagement seem slim at the present time. The position in Berlin, however, is so unsatisfactory that we probably cannot continue to put off an effort to resolve it much longer. It is doubtful whether Russia would want to pay the price of driving us out of Berlin by force, but the existing arrangement leaves them the initiative in harassment and negotiation, while the West is left with the unpleasant opportunity to take the lead in overt military action. Moreover, rigidity is putting severe strain on our alliance. Obviously most settlements would also put strains on the alliance, but there would be hope of living these down, while the existing inter-allied tensions can only deepen.

The only settlement imaginable involves some *de facto* recognition of East Germany coupled with assurances to Russia about German armaments, in return for recognition of the rights of West Berlin and of its access to the outside world. Objections to such a deal are many and well known; its adverse effects on German morale, the fact that each added degree of legitimacy accorded East Germany may seem to heighten the absurdity of West Berlin. The latter objection might be somewhat offset by the formal Soviet recognition of West Berlin's status and by some United Nations' presence to increase the propaganda inhibitions against further Communist encroachments. We should have to recognize that respect for the rights of Berlin would still rest, not on Soviet good faith in honoring an agreement, but on the sanctions that could be brought to bear against violation.

In this respect we are perhaps less helpless than is generally believed. It is to be hoped that, despite the self-assuring threats uttered by our strategists as part of the psychology of deterrence, we would not really launch all-out thermonuclear war even for Berlin. But we have a number of limited responses that Russia must take seriously, ranging from a wide variety of economic counter-measures to a full scale mobilization that would put an unbearable burden on the Communists' fully-extended resources.

As for German morale, there are undoubtedly limits to the wisdom of surrendering an ally's interests. But this cannot extend to illusory ambitions. Sooner or later the fiction that East Germany can soon be reunited with the Western camp will have to be abandoned. Some illusions may be noble and inspiring and may even call forth efforts of will that make them reality. Perhaps the British failure to surrender in 1940 was an instance. But too many or too sweeping self-deceptions can undermine all rational policy. And illusions are particularly dangerous in an age of deterrence when encroachment on the illusion may be taken as the signal for violent reaction.

Two other aspects of the problem of political settlement deserve brief mention. One is the possibility of making settlements outside Europe. All of the general considerations mentioned earlier are relevant here also. In such places as Vietnam or Laos there may be a temporary balance of forces—forces including Soviet reluctance to defeat hopes of winning over the whole uncommitted world by precipitate action in particular areas—where we might arrange a military or political truce. One great difficulty is that, though there are exceptions, as perhaps recently in Laos, the West seems more likely to take such a truce more seriously than the Communists. Thus such agreements can become merely a series of halts in a steady Communist advance, resting places from which they, but never we, set out on further advances.

Agreements of this kind can therefore be safely made only if we again bear it constantly in mind that it is not Communist good will or sense of legality, but the power wielded by the West or indigenous governments, that gives the settlements its validity.

Settlements are consequently not occasions for subsequent relaxation but for redoubled efforts to build up the counterweights to communism. In the same way, any general schemes such as those for the neutralization or demilitarization of Africa will only be a prelude to Communist success if we do not on the one hand vigorously encourage political resistance to such encroachments and, on the other, stand ready to meet military breaches of the agreement in kind.

This introduces a final point with regard to the political context of arms control. All the foregoing remarks apply with even greater force to a world in which the professed common American and Russian aims of general disarmament were realized. The cold war and a host of other disputes would persist and we must therefore give thought to the ways in which we would defend our interests in such a world. The Communists are past masters of combat by subversive and quasi-military means; all too often it is the West that has had to resort to open violence. In view of this, amazingly little attention has been given to the unilateral influences

we might employ in such a world, to the international machinery that might be necessary and, in general, to the pattern of politics in a disarmed world.¹ The prospect of a totally disarmed world may be remote, but the problem of preserving a political balance in such a world deserves consideration if only because it presents, in pure form, questions that are raised in a limited form by many proposals for arms control or disengagement.

The general principle is clear. Political settlements are maintained between hostile states by a balance of interests and power. Any proposal to manipulate one of the most important instruments of power, military force, by some scheme of arms control necessarily raises the question of how the equilibrium will be maintained. In the same way, any proposal for an adjustment of political interests raises a question as to how it will affect the instruments of force by which national interests in general are maintained. To insist that such questions be put and answered is not to minimize the value of proposals for such settlements and adjustments. On the contrary, it is the only way in which they can be responsibly and realistically pursued.

¹ For a fuller treatment of this subject see my "Beyond Arms Control" in *Arms and Arms Control* edited by Ernest Lefever, New York, 1962.

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our system against Communist challenges in a non-military arena.

This is the time for a reassessment, and for a new realism in our appreciation of the Soviet menace. It is not enough to identify international communism as an all-enveloping menace, exhausting our energies, our patience, and even our interest. Nor can we

permit our ideological inclinations to dismiss the military challenge as superficial. Of course it is superficial—but it may also be decisive. We have reason to fear the Soviet Union. We also have some reason to fear that despite the perceptiveness of our government, we may find ourselves overly reluctant to identify in time the sound and fundamental reasons for our alarm.

"Our monopoly of atomic weapons at the end of World War II . . . led us to dissolve most of our victorious forces . . . and to turn to dependence on atomic weapons delivered from the air. . . . Our military strategy became one of Massive Retaliation. This strategic doctrine was formalized and placed into effect in 1953 as the New Look, and carried forward until very recent times.

"Massive Retaliation as a strategy was simple to understand and sounded cheap. But, as events later proved, it was too simple for a complex modern world, and its alleged cheapness was an illusion as mounting defense budgets soon showed."—General Maxwell D. Taylor, *Military Representative of President Kennedy*, January 15, 1962.

Writing of the possibility of a "peace race," this specialist believes that "As the new strategy of the peace race is developed, Americans will be able to select international moves from among a wider array of alternatives. Most important . . . the Soviets, confronted with the political-economic thrust of the peace race, will be compelled to act seriously in disarmament negotiations."

To Make Disarmament Real

By SEYMOUR MELMAN

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MAJOR obstacles to disarmament do not lie in the realm of plausible ways for designing and implementing such agreements.¹ Rather, the essential requirement is a method of political policy which at once deals with American international relations more efficiently than the arms race, and also compels the Soviets to take disarmament seriously.

On its own terms, the arms race has reached a dead end. No one knows how to define "superior" military strength when each antagonist can destroy the other, and when "winning" a nuclear war has no plausible political meaning. When the military chiefs of the United States instructed the American population to seek shelter underground, that was an admission of their inability to assure the military defense of the shores of the United States with reasonable probability of success. This inability is caused by the sustained superiority of offensive military methods.

Nevertheless, for many Americans, the possession and enlargement of a vast military machine is the main conceivable alternative to a position of "nakedness." I believe that

other major paths in policy are possible by which the United States can use its still unmatched production power as an instrument for winning a world victory for peace with freedom.

The peace race² is a world policy for the West, in which the production power of the United States, instead of military power, can be used as a strategic instrument. The peace race includes competition and cooperation with the Soviet system. Competition is centered on an American effort to industrialize the world while maintaining freedom. Cooperation includes life-serving activities of every sort, of which controlled disarmament is the most important. I believe that American success in a program for world industrialization will be a powerful lever for compelling the Soviets to attend to disarmament in a serious way.

The major contest for political allegiance between East and West centers on the underdeveloped countries of the world. For the one billion inhabitants of Asia (excluding China), Africa and Latin America, the central question is: how is it possible to industrialize rapidly? The Soviets offer an explicit and powerful answer—industrialization at speed can be achieved only with a thoroughly managerial society, centrally organized in a dictatorial hierarchy that wields a monopoly of decision-making power. The absence of personal and political freedom

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¹ S. Melman, ed., *Inspection for Disarmament*, N. Y., Columbia University Press, 1958.

² S. Melman, *The Peace Race*, George Braziller, N. Y., Ballantine Books, 1961.

is regarded as a necessary price of rapid growth. In the West there is the implicit counterclaim that industrialization can be achieved without jeopardizing personal and political freedom. The implication has been that this, in turn, is possible only under an economy of competitive private firms. This appears to be a prescription for a slow process, and does not meet the impatient demand that industrialization be carried out at a speed that makes a major difference within a single lifetime.

The achievement of rapid industrialization with freedom is frustrated by the need to accumulate industrial resources out of the meager means of impoverished peasants. For extracting industrial investment funds out of peasants who earn from \$60 to \$100 yearly the ruthless police measures of the Soviet and especially of the Chinese economies are well-suited, indeed essential. There are two problems here to which the United States can make a dramatic contribution: first a supply of capital for industrialization; and second, methods for ensuring personal and political freedom while making use of the efficiencies of large, planned organizations.

Costs of Industrialization

In its third five-year plan, India invests about \$10 per person per year. A more intensive level of investment is to be reached under the second development plan in Ghana where investment for industrialization will amount altogether to about \$37 per year. If we apply these annual per capita investment rates to the total population of Asia, Africa and Latin America, this suggests an annual range of capital investment for industrialization from about \$10 billion to about \$37 billion per year for the entire area. Such estimates, while crude, do give us useful orders of magnitude against which to gauge the capability of the United States.

The upper end of this range of investment intensity amounts to less than ten per cent of the gross national product of the United States. In a worldwide industrialization program this probably represents an outside figure. The rate at which people can learn the ways of industrial life is surely a major restriction on the pace of economic progress.

An increase in American industrial production of this magnitude is feasible with the unused industrial capacity and underemployed labor force of American industry. It is important that the industrial goods-producing industries have been the concentration point of our unused capacity. These industries are the crucial ones for supplying the capital goods that are critical for industrialization. Indeed, it is more than likely that the capability of the United States for supplying goods for industrialization is well in excess of the ability of these countries to absorb such goods.

During World War II we learned that we did not really know how to define the upper limit of America's ability to produce new industrial capacity. For example, the automobile industry has operated during recent years with substantial unused capacity. In the United States, we have about two million metal-working machines in all industries. If the unused capacity of the auto industry were appropriately regrouped, it is probable that it could duplicate, at least once a year, the largest part of our metal-working machine stock.

It is important that the United States is the only industrial center in the world with a major block of unused industrial capabilities. The Soviet industrial system is clearly stretched taut and the economy of Western Europe is heavily occupied. This unused production might of the United States, ordinarily a business and economic liability, can be turned into a strategic political-economic asset.

A second crucial requirement for success in a peace race policy is the use of methods of organization—economic and political—that will give strong support to personal and political freedom in society. This result is supported by two conditions in economic and social life: the right of independent organization, widely applied; and second, the existence of multiple sources of decision-making in society.

The right of independent organization means not only the right of free association of individuals but also the right to form economic and other organizations in society. The essential point here is that no existing organization prevents new organizations from being formed. Therefore, no vested

interest in any organization, economic or otherwise, can exercise decision-power on a permanent, unchallenged basis. In the industrial system of the United States this condition is substantially satisfied by the existence of a variety of autonomous organizations. Plainly, even the largest managements must heed the opinions, not only of other managements, but also of trade unions, government bodies, and all manner of political pressure groups. The right of independent organization, extending from industrial enterprises to poetry circles, is one of the elements that critically differentiates the Soviet system from Western democracy.

The wide exercise of the right of independent organization creates multiple sources of decision-making in society. As a result, the chief administrators of even our largest organizations cannot convert their economic decision-power into monopoly political power.

The Soviet system offers the counterpoint to these conditions. That form of society prohibits independent organization, and only one source of decision-power is permitted—the party-state machine. In economic life the contrast is sharp indeed. Independent managements, or independent unions, or independent literary circles, are prohibited in the Soviet scheme. By contrast, the presence of these rights in the United States, for example, contributes strongly to diversity in sources of decision-making. This, in turn, is a major support for the freedom of the individual.

In my estimate, these characteristics of industrial and political systems can be fruitfully examined as the basis of ensuring personal and political freedom in society, even when large, planned organizations are used in economic life. If we proceed with confidence to encourage industrialization under such conditions, I believe that we shall enable the developing countries to enjoy freedom in society even while government is a major source of economic initiative. Plainly, I have tried to identify conditions that restrain political monopoly and support freedom in American society, even while large firms play a major part in the American economy and the role of government in economic life is ever more extensive.

The practice of independent organization

in industrial life and the existence of multiple sources of decision-making are powerful incentives to rapid growth of industrial productivity. The interplay of decision-making by management and workers in the United States has pressed management to apply methods of mechanization and organization which enhance the productivity of both labor and capital. The result of this process is plain for all to see: the productivity of the United States is the highest in the world. By defining the conditions that have generated the American level of productivity we invite and encourage other countries to do the same.

An effort for world-wide industrialization is a most intricate undertaking. There are a host of problems that would press for solution. How can training in the arts of living and working in an industrial society be accelerated? By what means can the shocks of transition from primitive to industrial culture be cushioned? How can industrial goods be fashioned to suit the conditions of workers, technicians and administrators who have limited experience? How can marketing and distribution be organized as efficient functions to parallel expanding industrial output?

For the United States and the other industrialized countries of the West, there would be a range of pressing problems too. How is such an effort to be financed? What are the possible combinations of private and public sources of capital and cooperation for doing the job? By what means can we ensure that funds made available for industrialization are not diverted to private bank accounts? What shall be the entrance requirements for participation in this effort? How should capital be made available to industrializing countries so as to assure responsibility in its use: are long-range, low-interest loans, payable in local currency, preferable to outright grants? How can implementation be organized that will minimize administrative burdens and costs?

These and many more problems will appear. I am confident, however, that solutions can be found, for the political gain that will result from the peace race will excite the creative intelligence of millions of men.

In sum, the competitive side of the peace race consists of a world-wide program for in-

dustrialization to which the United States contributes industrial capital, and methods of economic and social organization that support personal and political freedom.

For the United States, starting the peace race does not require that the arms race be ended as a precondition. The production increases that would be necessary for mounting a powerful peace race effort are attainable now, even while carrying the arms burden. This possibility is open only for the United States.

In order to compete in a peace race, the Soviets will be compelled to seek disarmament. Already stretched taut, the Soviet economy is incapable of the same production feat as that of the United States. This is a link between the competition for industrialization, a powerful move in its own right, and international cooperation for disarmament.

Economic Effects

The peace race effort will have an exhilarating effect on the American economy. Production capacity will be used to maximum for a long time, especially in the industrial goods producing industries. Therefore, the cost of production of many products should be reduced. This will open up opportunities for price reduction, with widespread effect on the modernization and re-equipment of American domestic industry, even while industrial goods are being exported in large quantities. The lowered price of industrial equipment together with sustained markets at home and abroad will encourage the re-equipment of many industrial plants. In the crucial metal-working field, for example, about two-thirds of the American production equipment is now more than ten years old. The replacement of this equipment will, in turn, accelerate industrial productivity.

Many of the machinery-producing industries have been traditionally organized in groups of small and medium-sized firms that use small-quantity production methods. This inefficient mode of organization has been suitable for uncertain and highly unstable markets. The market conditions of the peace race will encourage re-organization in many of these industries and the application of mass production technology.

The labor force will have full employment

conditions under the peace race. Many problems of labor training and utilization that stem from the increased automation of production will become less awkward problems under full employment. An expanding economy provides the best background for occupational retraining, and even for the transfer of entire industrial plants.

An important allied capability that will stem from the peace race will be the ability of the American economy to adapt to reductions in military programs. The problems of economic conversion under partial or total disarmament are most easily dealt with within the framework of an expanding, full-employment economy. I believe that a vigorous peace race policy from the United States would probably strengthen the hand of the "liberal" as against the "neo-Stalinists" in Soviet society.

The political and the economic thrust of the peace race will give the United States a new set of prospects for both international and domestic policy. As the new strategy of the peace race is developed, Americans will be able to select international moves from among a wider array of alternatives. Most important, I estimate that the Soviets, confronted with the political-economic thrust of the peace race, will be compelled to act seriously in disarmament negotiations.

Chairman Khrushchev recently indicated that in discussions with President Kennedy, they had both agreed that the Soviet Union and the United States now had equal strength. This referred to military strength. For international political bargaining within the framework of an arms race, the possession of nuclear weapons in quantity has an "equalizing" effect. Indeed, preoccupation with calculations of a military sort leads to neglect of the vast differences in economic power between the two countries.

The industrial and agricultural man-hours of the United States are three to four times more productive than those of the Soviet Union. These differences in economic power can be turned into major political assets. I propose that a peace race be mounted to turn this difference in production capability into a major instrument for making disarmament necessary and possible, and for winning a world victory for freedom in society.

Received At Our Desk

Conscience and Weapons . . .

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE CONFLICT OF CONSCIENCE. EDITED BY JOHN C. BENNETT. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962. 170 pages, notes, reading list and index, \$3.95.)

This thought-provoking symposium deals with the moral horn of the nuclear dilemma: the "question of the degree of destruction a nuclear war might cause us to inflict on human beings in another nation." As the foreword warns, unless the moral issues of nuclear war are discussed, "there is danger that there [will] be a serious atrophy of conscience." In this slender volume, John Herz, David Inglis, Kenneth Thompson, John Bennett, Erich Fromm, Paul Ramsey and Roger Shinn focus on the implications of nuclear war for the human conscience.

ARMS AND ARMS CONTROL. A SYMPOSIUM. EDITED BY ERNEST W. LEFEVER. (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962. 306 pages, appendices, bibliography, and notes on contributors, \$6.75.)

Most of the 29 contributors to this symposium share "the new strategic and arms control consensus"; i.e., "that there are three major paths to greater security": unilateral moves to reduce tension; tacit agreements; formal agreement. Although the contributors "share the same general approach to the problem," the diversity of their views is significant. This is a collection of recent reprints; some appear in full; some are abridged.

THE BALANCE OF POWER AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. EDITED BY DAYTON D. MCKEAN. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962. 209 pages, bibliography and index, \$1.95.)

This book of readings includes the writing of the classical exponents of the balance of power doctrine and its current advocates; the editor compares their doc-

trines with those of the neo-classical school of nuclear deterrence. The selections include 14 excerpts on the balance of power, eight selections on nuclear deterrence and editorial comment. The result should be useful for study groups and students in international relations courses.

THE LIMITS OF DEFENSE. BY ARTHUR I. WASKOW. (New York: Doubleday, 1962. 190 pages, \$2.95.)

Criticizing the fact that "Americans have so far 'played' Deterrence as if it were a game," this author believes that "the stakes we play for are so high that the game model cannot advance our thinking on deterrence . . . the world in which great alliances clash is the real world. . . ." Here is a stimulating approach to practical steps toward "Disarmament plus," which grew out of a staff report the author prepared for a congressman on the nature of American defense policy.

THE LEGACY OF HIROSHIMA. BY EDWARD TELLER WITH ALLEN BROWN. (New York: Doubleday, 1962. 315 pages and index, \$4.95.)

Pleading that the United States must maintain a lead in the arms race and must plan to defend its civil population, Edward Teller draws on his considerable prestige as father of the H-Bomb and maintains that "Properly prepared, we can survive a nuclear attack." He calls for four major steps for American defense: passive civil defense; ability to strike the second blow; preparation for limited warfare; the establishment of a "lawful and prosperous community of nations to ensure peace," to be established with the time we gain once we are so well prepared that the Soviet Union will not attack us. This well-written, sometimes even eloquent book is worth reading if only for historical interest in the development of the H-Bomb; Tell-

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Current Documents

KHRUSHCHEV CONCURS ON SPACE COOPERATION

On March 21, 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, in a letter released by *Tass* (Soviet Press agency), accepted President John F. Kennedy's proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States arrange joint cooperation in their countries' space exploration programs. Relevant excerpts of the Premier's message are reprinted below:

Esteemed Mr. President,

Acquainting myself attentively with your message of March 7 of this year, I note with satisfaction that my appeal to you of February 21 with a proposal that both countries should pool their efforts to explore outer space, has been met with the necessary understanding of the United States government.

* * *

It seems to me, Mr. President, that in general it is now being recognized increasingly that practical steps are needed in the noble cause of developing international cooperation in space research for peaceful purposes. Your message shows that your trend of mind actually does not differ from our idea of practical measures in the field of this cooperation. What should we start from?

I should like to point out in this connection several problems of exploration and peaceful uses of outer space, for whose solution, in our view, the pooling of efforts by states is required. Some of them, envisaged in the recent decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, adopted on the initiative of our two countries, are mentioned in your message.

1. Scientists believe that at the modern stage of space exploration it is quite possible to use artificial earth satellites for creating international networks of super long distance communications. The implementation of these projects can lead to a considerable improvement of means of communications and television on the earth. People will get reliable means of communications, new unprecedented possibilities will arise for expanding contacts between the peoples. So let us begin with finding out the condition for the possibilities for the solution of this problem.

As I have understood from your message, the United States is also ready for this.

2. It is difficult to over-estimate the benefit which could be brought to mankind by organizing a world weather observation service with the aid of artificial earth satellites. Precise and timely weather forecasts will be another important step along the way to man's conquering of nature. . . . Let us cooperate in this field, too.

3. We believe it would be expedient to reach agreement on the organization of observations with the help of radio-technical and optical means, under a joint program, of objects launched in the direction of the moon, Mars, Venus and other planets of the solar system. . . .

4. At the present stage of man's inroads into outer space, it is very desirable to draft and conclude an international agreement providing for assistance in the search for and rescue of spaceships, sputniks and capsules that descend to the earth due to accident. Such an agreement seems even more necessary because the point in question here is the saving of lives of cosmonauts. . . .

5. Your message contains a proposal for cooperation of our countries in compiling charts of the earth's magnetic field in outer space with the aid of sputniks, as well as exchange of knowledge in the field of space medicine. I can say that Soviet scientists are ready for such cooperation and exchange of data on these questions with the scientists of other countries.

6. I think, Mr. President, that the time has come also for our two countries, which have advanced more than the others in space exploration, to try to find a common approach to the settlement of important legal problems that life itself sets before states in

the age of space. In this connection I regard as a positive fact that at the United Nations General Assembly session, the Soviet Union and the United States found it possible to agree on the proposal about the initial principles of space legislation, which was then unanimously approved by all the member states of the United Nations: about the spread of international law, including the United Nations Charter, to outer space and the celestial bodies, and that the outer space and celestial bodies are accessible to all for research and use by all states in accordance with international law and cannot be annexed by any states.

In our opinion, we should go even further now.

The expansion of space exploration, carried out by the states, definitely gives rise to the need for also reaching agreement that no one should create obstacles, during space experiments, to the study and use of outer space for peaceful purposes by other nations. Maybe it is necessary to make provisions that the experiments in outer space, which may render difficult the exploration of outer space by other countries, should be the subject of preliminary discussion and agreement on a proper international basis.

Mr. President, I have stated only several

of the questions, the solution of which, in our point of view, has become ripe already now and demands cooperation between our countries. In the future international cooperation in space exploration, if we can now lay a firm basis for it, will doubtlessly spread to ever new and new fields of space research. . . .

The Soviet representatives in the United Nations Space Committee will be instructed to meet with United States representatives to discuss the concrete questions of cooperation in the exploration and peaceful use of outer space, that are of interest to our two countries.

* * *

At the same time it seems obvious to me that the scope of our cooperation in the peaceful exploration of space, just as the choice of the directions themselves, along which such cooperation will be possible, depend to some extent on the settlement of the disarmament problem. . . .

* * *

We hope that agreement on general and complete disarmament will be achieved. We are exerting and will exert every effort to this end. I should like to trust that you, too, Mr. President, will spare no effort to act in the same direction.

(Continued from page 306)

er's political and strategic views, while open to criticism, are worthy of study.

100 MILLION LIVES. MAXIMUM SURVIVAL IN A NUCLEAR WAR. BY RICHARD FRYKLUND. (New York: Macmillan, 1962. 171 pages and bibliography, \$3.95.)

Richard Fryklund pleads that a "nuclear-war strategy based on control and restraint," (i.e., one in which both sides agree to spare cities and civilian populations) will save 100 million lives. What he terms the "No-City strategy" will, he believes, "give us the best chance of winning and surviving" a major war. The author indicates that United States strategists are coming to this view of the "game" after computer-based calculations of alternative destruction potentials. He puts his own finger on the grave weakness of this view when he raises the question, in

a chapter heading, "Will Russia Play the Game?"

THE BALANCE OF TERROR. STRATEGY FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE. BY GENERAL PIERRE GALLOIS. Translated from the French by Richard Howard (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961. 234 pages, \$4.00.)

Noting that "Since Hiroshima, a generalized conflict has been avoided because every power knows that the cost of resorting to force would have no relation to the slender advantages it would afford," this French General believes that "atomic weapons recently tested . . . could enforce the world-wide substitution of discussion for attack." He pins his hope for survival not on limited warfare nor any theory of games but on the horror of annihilation in the era of a balanced terror.

By CAROL L. THOMPSON

(Continued from page 295)

dent of the United States or wreck the conference. He thus displayed his revolutionary militancy and covered up his diplomatic failure. But he had gained only a temporary respite; Berlin was still unfinished business.

Meanwhile a new factor began to operate to his disadvantage. In his wooing of the United States he had neglected the interests of China; having undertaken the difficult task of persuading the American government to give him Berlin, he was not going to render it impossible by adding demands on behalf of his Far Eastern ally. But the Chinese regarded his conduct as treachery, and began a campaign of biting criticism against him which did not refer to him by name, but damned him by implication.

Khrushchev could not suppress this propaganda from Peking and it had its influence within the Soviet Union. So strong was the undercurrent of opposition to Khrushchev that the Twenty-Second Party Congress, which was to have been a publicity show for the new Party Program for realizing full communism, had to be turned into a heresy-hunt against the "anti-Party group," and especially Vyacheslav Molotov, who, it was revealed, had written a letter to the Central Committee of the party denouncing the new line in foreign policy.

At the time of writing, the deadlock over Berlin remains unbroken, and it remains to be seen whether Khrushchev will follow up his tentative moves to obstruct the air corridors to Berlin with more serious forms of interference. A new blockade of Berlin would involve a danger of war, and there is good reason to believe that Khrushchev does not want to go over the brink. On the other hand, he is under very strong pressure to get his way on an issue on which he has so deeply committed himself, and any settlement which does not give East Germany the power to prevent anyone from entering or leaving West Berlin will be a failure for him.

It is perhaps to divert attention from the Berlin deadlock that Khrushchev has recently concentrated his diplomatic activity on the issue of disarmament; here he can at least gain much neutral support and pillory the Western powers as the enemies of peace. But for serious negotiation he is under pressures from home even stronger than those which

constrain him over Berlin. Khrushchev cannot accept any really effective system of arms inspection on Soviet territory because the Communist party simply could not tolerate such a thing. Its totalitarian rule involves an absolute authority over every Soviet citizen which cannot admit of any exception.

If non-Communist foreigners were to have the right to travel in the Soviet Union and make investigations without Soviet officials being able to stop them, and if Soviet citizens were to be entitled to provide information without reference to the K.G.B. (the Committee of State Security), the very foundations of the Communist regime would be undermined. For Communists such infringements of sovereignty are unthinkable. The Western powers must have disarmament without inspection or not at all.

It is a mistake to think of Khrushchev as a dictator who can do as he pleases. The dictatorship is that of the Party rather than of an individual, and Khrushchev has less autocratic power than Stalin had. The Party's primary aim is to maintain its monopoly of political power within the Soviet Union; its second is to preserve Communist power in the satellite states, and particularly in East Germany—where it is most precarious—because a collapse of Communist rule in any one country would start a chain reaction in the others and in the Soviet Union itself. In this context the capture of West Berlin is the most important objective, and it is certainly also recognized that Western abandonment of Berlin, by causing Germans to lose faith in Western support, would provide an opportunity to draw West Germany into the Russian orbit, using the good offices of Dr. Dehler to that end.

In a confrontation of such diametrically opposed interests there is indeed very little room for successful negotiation, and hopes for peace must principally be set on the frequently expressed recognition by the Soviet leadership of the need to avoid nuclear war—as in *Pravda*, January 17, 1962:

"in such a war losses of life would be counted not in tens but in many hundreds of millions . . . the avoidance of a world thermo-nuclear catastrophe is the essential condition for any progress.

On this point at least, it seems, Russia and the West can agree.

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of March, 1962, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin

March 1—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggests that access to Berlin be administered by an international agency.

March 2—Soviet authorities order border police to stop the U.S. Commandant, Major General Albert Watson 2d, from entering East Berlin.

March 10—Sources from West Berlin report that yesterday Soviet planes, flying in the 3 Allied air corridors to West Berlin, dropped chaff (thin metallic strips) to confuse the radar screens used to regulate Western flights into West Berlin.

March 11—East German border guards open fire on a British military car, wounding its driver. Soviet officials in East Germany regret the incident.

Meeting in Geneva prior to the opening of the 17-nation disarmament talks, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and British Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Home, discuss the Berlin situation.

March 14—President Kennedy denounces Soviet tactics in the Berlin air corridor.

March 22—It is disclosed that East German police fired on a U.S. military car, part of the U.S. mission attached to the Soviet Army in East Germany, earlier this week.

Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko confer in Geneva on the Berlin crisis. The Soviet Union suggests that an international authority oversee a free city of West Berlin and access lines to it. The Soviet proposal calls for the withdrawal of Allied powers from Berlin and for East German control over access routes between West Germany and Berlin. The U.S. rejects this plan.

March 27—The military adviser to President Kennedy, General Maxwell D. Taylor, arrives in Berlin. He pledges U.S.

determination to preserve West Berlin's freedom.

March 31—A.D.N. (East German press agency) announces that the U.S. military mission at Potsdam has been sealed off and the travel of military personnel there restricted. The A.D.N. says that the Russian step is in retaliation for the U.S. Army restriction on the Soviet military mission at Frankfurt.

Disarmament

March 3—The U.S.S.R. charges that U.S. President Kennedy is resorting to apparent blackmail in stating that the U.S. will resume atmospheric nuclear tests unless the U.S.S.R. signs a test ban treaty.

March 5—The French government announces that no French representatives will attend the Geneva conference on disarmament.

March 11—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk arrives in Geneva for a foreign ministers' meeting preliminary to the opening of the disarmament conference.

March 12—The U.S.S.R. says it will withhold nuclear weapons information from other countries if the Western nuclear powers will do likewise.

March 14—The Geneva conference on disarmament sponsored by the U.N. opens. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko rejects Western suggestions for international inspection.

The U.S. refuses a commitment to abstain from stationing nuclear weapons on Allied territory.

March 15—The U.S.S.R. refuses to accept the U.S. suggestion for inspection.

March 23—The U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Britain report to the conference that they have reached a deadlock.

March 27—Dean Rusk warns the Geneva conference that the world's destructive ca-

capacity will double by 1966 if the arms race does not stop.

March 29—President Kennedy states that test ban negotiations "seem to be at a real impasse."

International Labor Organization

March 6—The 40-member governing body of the 102-nation I.L.O. votes to re-elect David A. Morse as director general for a 5 year term.

United Nations

March 2—More than 100 economists end 2 weeks of meetings on plans for the Alliance for Progress program.

March 5—Yevgeny D. Kiselev succeeds Georgi P. Arkadyev as U.N. Under Secretary for Political and Security Council Affairs; he is the highest-ranking Russian in the U.N. Secretariat.

March 9—It is disclosed that on March 5 the U.S.S.R. paid the U.N. \$1.5 million in arrears for the U.N. budget for 1961.

March 10—48 countries agree on a 3-year pact to stabilize wheat and flour prices. The U.S.S.R. has participated in the negotiations.

March 14—The West German Republic promises to buy \$10 million in U.N. bonds; this is the first pledge from a non-member. The total so far pledged is \$147,085,000 out of a \$200,000,000 bond issue.

The Security Council opens hearings on Cuban charges that the U.S. inspired the Organization of American States to act illegally in excluding Cuba from its activities and that the U.S. is now planning armed aggression against Cuba.

March 23—The Security Council turns down the Cuban charges of aggression and illegality against the U.S. and the Organization of American States.

March 26—The U.S.S.R. provides the U.N. with information on 16 space flights including the flights of Gagarin and Titov for its public register. Because of opposition by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Agency, the U.S. has not yet provided the U.N. with information about the Glenn space flight.

March 27—The U.N. reports that U.N. ob-

servers will check border areas around the Sea of Galilee to make sure neither Israel nor Syria are preparing to attack one another.

West Europe

March 2—In Geneva, European Free Trade Association delegates (Outer Seven) confer on negotiations to join the European Economic Community (Common Market).

March 23—Nordic Council members sign a Scandinavian cooperation treaty, providing for cooperation in the fields of culture, law, economics, social welfare and traffic.

The Common Market's Council of Ministers agrees in principle to hasten the tariff-reducing time schedule for the European Economic Community. This will be the second such advance in schedule.

March 27—The European Parliamentary Assembly elects Gaetano Martino of Italy as president. He replaces West German Hans Furler.

ARGENTINA

March 18—General elections for 86 of the 194 seats in the Chamber of Deputies are held. Elections are held also for 14 provincial governors and senators and deputies in 17 provincial legislatures. Early returns indicate a victory for Peronist candidates and a defeat for President Arturo Frondizi's Intransigent Radicals. In San Juan and Buenos Aires Provinces, 2 key election areas, Peronists are leading by substantial amounts.

March 19—President Frondizi orders military commanders in 5 Argentine Provinces, where Peronist candidates were victorious, to take over the governments. The election gave the Peronists (who received wide Communist support) some 43 seats in the Congress. The Intransigent Radicals lost 23 seats and their majority; they now have 76 seats in the Chamber. Peronist leaders term the election a rejection of Frondizi's austerity program; they urge the recall of ex-dictator Juan D. Perón from his exile in Spain.

March 20—It is reported that top military leaders have demanded Frondizi's resigna-

tion, in a meeting between the military and the President to discuss the Peronist victory; and that Frondizi has refused.

March 21—From his exile in Spain, Peron charges that the U.S. is "meddling" in Argentina's affairs to keep Peronists from office. Peron has been in exile in Spain for 27 months.

Frondizi, in a communiqué, announces that he will not accept the resignations of two military secretaries, and that he is also abstaining on the resignation of other Cabinet members. The Cabinet has resigned in favor of a new coalition government.

March 23—A 24-hour general strike called by Peronist unions causes a walkout by 1 million members. Frondizi consults with former President Pedro Eugenio Aramburu.

March 25—Navy Secretary Gaston C. Clement announces that the Navy has demanded the resignation of Frondizi officially. Frondizi completes a new 8-man Cabinet.

Aramburu addresses the nation in a television-radio broadcast to urge calm, and tell of his efforts to settle the conflict between Frondizi and the military.

March 27—Frondizi announces that he will not resign from the presidency. It is reported that Aramburu has requested that Frondizi step down.

March 29—Reliable sources report that late yesterday the Argentine military executed a peaceful coup and took over key points.

Frondizi is arrested by military forces.

March 30—President of the Senate José María Guido becomes Argentine's president with the endorsement of the armed services.

BRAZIL

March 7—Ex-President Janio Quadros who resigned 6 months ago returns from his voluntary exile. He is greeted by crowds at the port of Santos.

March 19—President Joao Goulart at dedication ceremonies in the state of Parana begins the distribution of one million expropriated acres of land to small farmers.

March 30—The Governor of Guanabara State, Carlos Lacerda, takes control of the

Brazilian Telephone Company, a Canadian-owned operation.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Great Britain

March 2—Britain applies for membership in the European Coal and Steel Community.

March 5—Britain applies for membership in the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).

March 13—In north Blackpool, the Liberal party cuts into the Conservative majority support reducing the Tory majority by almost 15,000 votes. The Conservative candidate retains his seat.

March 14—In a by-election in Orpington, Kent, the Liberal party wins a Parliamentary seat with a lead of almost 8,000 votes.

India

March 3—The Government announces that Goa, Damao and Diu will soon be incorporated as a federal territory. These territories were taken from Portugal in December, 1961.

March 5—With only 2 seats undecided, the Congress party of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru has won 353 seats; all other parties hold 132 seats (the Communist party holds 29 seats), it is reported in New Delhi.

March 12—India welcomes Mrs. John Kennedy, wife of U.S. President Kennedy.

March 14—Finance Minister Morarji Desai presents the equivalent of a \$2,875,593,000 budget to Parliament; provision is made for an \$81,354,000 increase in military spending.

March 31—President Rajendra Prasad dissolves the *Lok Sabha* (lower chamber), ending the second Parliament of India. The *Rajya Sabha* and the *Lok Sabha* adjourned yesterday. The new Parliament will open April 16, with the new Government taking over a few days later. (See March 5, above.)

Nigeria

March 21—Governor General Nnamdi Azikiwe tells an opening session of Parlia-

ment about a 6-year development plan for Nigeria.

March 28—Malam Waziri Ibrahim details the 6-year £676,500,000 development plan to Parliament. An annual increase of at least 4 per cent in gross domestic product is planned.

Pakistan

March 1—President Mohammad Ayub Khan signs a 134-page constitution that will end almost 3 years of martial law when it goes into effect on the day of the first meeting of the National Assembly. Elections for the Assembly are still to be scheduled, but it is reported that the Assembly may meet in June. The new Constitution provides for a strong president, indirectly elected, and for indirectly elected central and provincial legislatures.

March 21—Mrs. John F. Kennedy, wife of the American President, arrives in Lahore.

BRITISH EMPIRE

British Guiana

March 17—Prime Minister Cheddi B. Jagan thanks the British for guiding his nation toward independence, and for helping his government after last month's rioting.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

March 8—Prime Minister Roy Welensky says he will call a new general election, seeking "for a mandate to prevent the break-up of the Federation." He is protesting British plans to offer Africans a better chance to get a legislative majority.

Welensky resigns as Prime Minister.

March 9—Welensky dissolves Parliament.

March 10—Election for parliament is set for April 27. The election will be held on the basis of an electoral roll giving whites a 10-1 voting majority although, in the Federation, Africans outnumber whites about 26-1.

Kenya

March 8—A conference on the status of Kenya's 10-mile-wide coastal strip opens in London.

March 21—In London, Colonial Secretary Reginald Maudling suggests that six re-

gional governments be established in Kenya, linked by a strong central government with a 2-house legislature. A coalition of the 2 African-controlled political parties is suggested so that they can form a government to control Kenya until independence. After 5 weeks, the constitutional conference for Kenya is deadlocked on the form of government for an independent nation.

Malta

March 3—George Borg Olivier becomes Malta's first Prime Minister in four years; a new constitution enlarges the self-governing powers of the island.

March 6—It is announced in London that Edward Birkbeck Wakefield will be first British Commissioner for Malta.

March 20—George Borg Olivier arrives in London to ask for modification of the Maltese constitution so that Malta can have full responsibility for police and civil service.

Tanganyika

March 7—The Government announces plans for forming two corporations to speed economic development.

Uganda

March 1—Uganda becomes internally self-governing after 72 years of British rule; 12 Africans, an Indian and a Briton form the first Cabinet under Prime Minister Benedicto Kiwanuka.

West Indies

March 5—Prime Minister of the West Indies Federation Sir Grantley Adams protests the British decision that the federation be dissolved, terming the British proposal "monstrous."

Zanzibar

March 18—A constitutional conference opens in London.

BURMA

March 2—General Ne Win announces in a radio broadcast that the military has taken

over the Burmese government. He declares that a 17-member Revolutionary Council, composed of military leaders, has been established. Premier U Nu and 5 of his Cabinet, it is reported, are arrested. The coup results from talks between U Nu and Shan leaders, who were urging a federal system on U Nu.

March 3—General Ne Win dissolves Parliament, suspends the Constitution, and invokes military rule for Burma.

March 12—General Ne Win takes over the presidential powers, formerly held by Win Maung. A Revolutionary Council decree gives its chairman, Ne Win, full administrative power.

CHILE

March 8—Following a review this week of Chile's economic and social problems by a U.S. Alliance for Progress delegation, Alliance Director Teodoro Moscoso pledges some \$120 million in aid to Chile for 1962. The commitment must be approved by Alliance for Progress officials in the U.S. A joint communiqué issued by Alliance for Progress delegations and Chilean leaders, including President Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez, states that the U.S. may give up to \$350 million to Chile during the first 5 years of its 10-year development program.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

March 27—The National People's Congress (parliament) meets in Peking for the first time in 2 years, attended by 1,000 delegates. Foreign diplomats and observers are barred.

COLOMBIA

March 18—Colombia holds an election for the 282 seats in its bicameral Congress.

March 19—Incomplete returns indicate a victory for the ruling Liberal-Conservative coalition government.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

March 5—U.N. and Katanga Province forces fire on each other at Kaminaville.

March 15—Secessionist Katanga Province President Moise Tshombe arrives in Leopoldville for talks with central government Premier Cyrille Adoula.

March 18—Talks open in Leopoldville between Adoula and Tshombe on ending Katanga's secession.

March 24—It is reported that talks between Adoula and Tshombe have been "suspended."

March 27—Adoula issues a communiqué accusing Tshombe of holding up talks on ending Katanga's secession.

March 29—Adoula and Tshombe confer again.

CUBA

March 9—The Cuban press announces that a 25-member directorate to head the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations has been established. The 25-members are all called "national leaders."

March 12—Premier Fidel Castro announces food rationing of rice and beans.

March 22—In the U.N. Security Council, Venezuela attacks Cuba's intention to appeal to the International Court of Justice on the O.A.S. exclusion vote of January, 1962. (See also *International*, U.N.)

March 25—Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro is named Vice Premier.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

March 8—Santo Domingo crowds demonstrate in front of the U.S. Consulate to protest the exile of 2 leaders. Yesterday ex-President Joaquin Balaguer and General Pedro Rodriguez Echavarria were sent to Puerto Rico. The crowds charge that the 2 leaders should have been given fair trial, and that the U.S. is implicated in their secret ouster.

EGYPT

March 9—President Gamal Abdel Nasser issues by decree a constitution for the Gaza strip, under Egyptian administration since 1948.

FINLAND

March 1—President Urho Kekkonen is inaugurated for his second 6-year term.

March 12—Kekkonen asks Veli Merikoski to form a new government.

FRANCE (See also *Algeria*.)

March 25—France recalls its Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. for "consultations" because of Soviet recognition of the Algerian rebel government, in an action short of suspension of diplomatic ties. Sergei A. Vinogradov, Soviet Ambassador to Paris, is asked to return to the U.S.S.R.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

March 3—Some 25 persons are reported dead as violence continues to sweep Algeria. Most of the deaths are Muslim. It is believed that the ultra right-wing European Secret Army Organization (O.A.S.) is responsible for the terrorism.

March 7—French and Algerian rebel delegations begin a conference at Evian-les-Bains, France, on an Algerian settlement.

March 9—French army forces and Algerian rebels fight along the Algerian-Tunisian border.

March 15—O.A.S. terrorists kill 3 French educators and 3 Muslim educators in Algiers. European ultras fire into a crowd of Muslims at a bus stop; at least 6 Muslims are killed and 13 wounded. The Muslim section of Algiers riots against Europeans.

March 18—After 7 years, 4 months and 18 days, an Algerian ceasefire is signed by French and Algerian representatives of the National Liberation Front at Evian-les-Bains, after 12 days of final negotiations. The ceasefire becomes effective at noon tomorrow. The negotiations were led by French Minister for Algerian Affairs Louis Joxe and Deputy Premier and Interior Minister of the rebels' Provincial Government Belkacem Krim. The accord provides for the guarantee of rights of the European minority; for maintaining French military in Algeria; for joint development of the Sahara; for amnesty for political and military prisoners; for an interim 12-man provisional executive. The provisional executive will rule Algeria's internal affairs until Algerians can vote in a referendum on Algerian inde-

pendence, to be held within 6 months. A High Commissioner to represent French sovereignty in the transitional period will be appointed.

In a radio-television broadcast, French President Charles de Gaulle praises the Algerian ceasefire. He says that he will give the French electorate a chance to approve the ceasefire in a referendum.

The Secret Army Organization distributes circulars to Algeria announcing a National Council of the French Resistance in Algeria to fight to restore French rule in Algeria.

March 19—A general strike ordered by the O.A.S. goes into effect in the large cities in Algeria. French army units in Algiers and Oran stand ready to enforce the ceasefire.

Christian Fouchet, French Ambassador to Denmark, is named High Commissioner for Algeria. The Soviet Union extends formal recognition to the new Algerian government and offers to establish diplomatic ties. (See *France*.)

March 20—President de Gaulle tells the National Assembly and the Senate (French Parliament) of the Algerian ceasefire. He declares that a referendum within 6 months will allow the Algerians to choose their own fate; he states that the Algerians will undoubtedly choose independence in cooperation with France. De Gaulle also tells the Parliament that a referendum on April 8 will ask French voters to approve special powers for the president in implementing the Algerian accord.

A renewal of violence in Algeria results in the deaths of some 50 persons in Oran yesterday. Some 30 more are killed today throughout Algeria.

March 23—French fighter planes attack the Bab-el-Oued section of Algiers, the stronghold of the O.A.S., to put down an O.A.S. revolt.

De Gaulle instructs the French Army to wage all-out war to suppress the O.A.S.

March 24—The French army takes control of the Bab-el-Oued quarter.

March 25—In Oran Europeans and French army troops battle for 5 hours.

Vice Premier of the Provisional Government Mohammed Ben Bella says that the rebel government's ministers have approved the ceasefire.

March 26—O.A.S. terrorists and French Army forces clash in Algiers. Some 50 French civilians are killed and about 150 are wounded.

It is announced that yesterday ex-French Air Force General Edmond Jouhaud, the second ranking leader of the O.A.S., was arrested, with other members of the O.A.S.

March 27—It is unofficially disclosed in Paris that the 12-man executive council for Algeria will be composed of 9 Muslims and 3 Europeans with Abderrahmane Fares as president of the executive. Fares is closely allied with the provisional rebel government.

March 28—O.A.S. leaflets circulated in Algiers declare "all-out guerrilla warfare" against France.

March 29—President of the Executive Council Fares and 6 other members arrive in Algeria.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

March 9—The West German Foreign Ministry announces that West German Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Hans Kroll will be transferred from his Moscow post to Bonn later this year. The announcement is made before Kroll, summoned home earlier, can confer with Adenauer.

GUATEMALA

March 15—Students and Guatemalan workers fight with police in the third consecutive day of rioting.

March 16—Army troops take control in Guatemala City. The demonstrations arose to protest fraud in the elections of December, 1961.

INDONESIA

March 11—The Netherlands returns 52 Indonesians taken prisoner in January off the coast of New Guinea.

March 22—Secret talks between the Netherlands and Indonesia over New Guinea are recessed. The talks are being held in Washington, D.C.

March 25—The Netherlands' Navy announces that Indonesian planes have attacked a small Dutch ship within New Guinea waters.

March 26—An Indonesian spokesman reports that Indonesia will not resume secret talks with the Netherlands in Washington.

Premier Jan E. de Quay declares that Dutch reinforcements have been sent to New Guinea.

IRAN

March 3—The Minister of Agriculture announces that under the new land reform law the first transfer of large estates by 3 landowners took place yesterday. The land will be distributed to peasants; the landowners will be recompensed.

March 6—Premier Ali Amini arrives in Britain to seek financial aid for his 5-year economic plan for Iran.

IRAQ

March 16—Following a 2-day conference, Iraqi Premier Abdul Karim Kassim and Syrian President Nazem el Kodsí issue an 8-point communiqué: the communiqué declares that a pan-Arab conference will be called, and endorses close cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

ISRAEL

March 17—Israeli troops attack Syria near El Kursi, destroying Syrian fortifications. It is estimated that some 30 Syrians have been killed in the attack.

March 22—Adolf Eichmann appeals to the Israeli Supreme Court against the death sentence imposed on him by a special tribunal. Eichmann asks to have his case tried in West Germany, and challenges the legality of the Israeli trial.

March 29—The Supreme Court adjourns to write its opinion in the Eichmann appeal.

ITALY

March 10—The Chamber of Deputies approves Premier Amintore Fanfani's Center-Left coalition government, composed of Christian Democrats, Democratic Socialists and Republicans.

March 15—The Senate votes approval of the new Fanfani government.

LAOS

March 11—King Savang Vathana condemns the U.S. withholding of its \$3 mil-

lion monthly aid payment for February, until rightist Premier Boun Oum will cooperate with neutralist and pro-Communist factions in forming a coalition government.

March 13—An economic austerity program and new restrictions on foreign currency are introduced because of the U.S. suspension of aid payments.

March 24—U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs W. Averell Harriman arrives in Laos to confer with Laotian leaders on establishing a coalition government.

NETHERLANDS, THE (See *Indonesia*.)

PERU

March 4—Peruvian *comuneros* (peasants) fight with government forces to maintain their occupation of 4 large cattle ranches in Cerro de Pasco, held by absentee landowners.

March 5—The government halts its fight to oust land-hungry peasants.

PORTUGAL

March 26—Some 4,000 Lisbon University students strike following police intervention to prevent their holding a rally on March 24.

March 27—The Portuguese government decides to allow the students to stage their rally.

SOUTH AFRICA

March 21—Finance Minister T. E. Donges announces that South Africa will spend \$162 million on defense in 1962, a rise of \$71 million over 1961.

SWITZERLAND

March 31—Swiss voters, in the first day of a 2-day vote, are asked to approve a constitutional amendment to prohibit nuclear weapons from storage or manufacture in Switzerland.

SYRIA (See also *Iraq and Israel*.)

March 28—Syrian army leaders, in a bloodless coup, oust the new Syrian government elected after the Syrian break with Egypt

in the fall of 1961. President Nazem el Kods, Premier Maarouf Dawalibi and Cabinet members resign. The parliament is dissolved. The Syrian army leaders declare that they will restore "constructive and just socialism," and will seek the cooperation of both "dear Egypt and sister Iraq."

THAILAND

March 7—A delivery of 28 U.S. jet planes is made to Thailand.

TURKEY

March 8—Premier Ismet Inonu's government issues a law banning all criticism of the May, 1960, revolt, among other restrictive provisions.

March 15—Foreign Minister Selim Sarper resigns.

March 27—The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development announces a credit of \$45 million for Turkey and a \$31 million loan from the International Monetary Fund.

U.S.S.R., THE (See also *France*.)

March 3—A Soviet First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, arrives in East Berlin. His motor trip along a decorated and prepared route brings few spectators who watch him pass in silence.

March 5—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev delivers a 6-hour speech to the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist party. Khrushchev condemns the farm lag; "as a result of the neglect of agricultural management, fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan has been placed in serious danger," and must be corrected (as reported by *Tass*, official Soviet Press agency).

March 11—The 9-point resolution adopted by the Central Committee is reported. Soviet agriculture is to be administered through regional agencies and a new cropping system will be introduced.

Tass reports a summary of Premier Khrushchev's closing address to the Central Committee on March 9. The Premier has denied an agricultural crisis, declaring that his criticism is based not on the fact that "we did little but because

we must do more." Khrushchev also stated that no increased expenditure for agriculture would be made before industrial and defense needs are first met.

March 12—The Soviet Union sends 4 military transports along one of the 3 Allied air corridors to Berlin at times and altitudes scheduled for Allied commercial planes. (See also *Int'l., Berlin.*)

March 13—Reuters, British new agency, is granted a double channel teleprinter line for the simultaneous receipt and transmission of world news. This is the first time the Soviet Union has permitted direct receipt of world news by a Western news service.

March 16—The Soviet Union announces that an earth satellite, the first in a test series to explore manned space flights, has been successfully fired. The satellite is in elliptical orbit ranging from 135 to 609 miles from earth.

Khrushchev, in a speech in the Kremlin, declares that the Soviet Union has a "global" rocket that is invulnerable and not detectable by the U.S. early warning system. He states that the U.S.S.R. will try to reach a disarmament agreement at Geneva. He warns that the Berlin situation must be settled. (See also *Int'l., Disarmament.*)

March 18—Elections for the Supreme Soviet (parliament) are held. A single list of Communist candidates is offered.

March 19—It is reported that 99.95 per cent of Soviet citizens voted yesterday.

March 21—Khrushchev accepts President Kennedy's proposal for Soviet-American joint cooperation in outer space exploration and research. The idea of joint space research was originally suggested by Khrushchev on February 20. Khrushchev declares that full cooperation is impossible until a general disarmament accord is reached. (See also p. 307 of this issue.)

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

March 21—A report from the Agriculture Department reveals that wheat farmers have agreed to reduce acreage some 22 per cent.

Civil Rights

March 27—A constitutional amendment banning the poll tax as a voting requirement in elections for federal officials is passed 77 to 16 in the Senate, after an almost two-week long filibuster. The measure now goes to the House.

Foreign Policy

March 6—In a joint statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, the U.S. promises to defend Thailand against direct Communist aggression.

March 7—The President tells Congress that to save overseas markets and strengthen trade negotiations with 24 nations, he has reduced duties on 1,000 items.

March 8—A 2-year cultural exchange agreement is signed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Scientific, educational and technical exchange is also provided.

Mrs. Kennedy leaves Washington for India and Pakistan.

March 10—Dean Rusk leaves for the Geneva arms conference.

March 13—President Kennedy greets Ahmadou Ahidjo, President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, who has arrived in Washington for a 2-day state visit.

March 18—Import of eight categories of cotton textiles from Hong Kong are banned by the Interagency Textile Administrative Committee.

March 19—Measures to give the Ryukyu Islands more independence and aid their economic development are announced by the President.

President Kennedy orders sharp duty increases on imported carpets and glass, and rejects suggestions for increases on baseball gloves and ceramic mosaic tile.

In his new book, *"Six Crises,"* former Vice-President Richard Nixon charges that President Kennedy endangered the security of our Cuban policy when he called for intervention in Cuba during the 1960 election campaign.

March 20—Washington Senator Henry M. Jackson, a Democrat, charges that the Kennedy and Eisenhower Administrations have overvalued the U.N.

Formerly secret state documents are

published by the State Department in a volume of "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, China."

March 27—The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. begin discussion of the possibility of cooperation in space exploration.

March 28—Mrs. Kennedy lunches with British Queen Elizabeth II at Buckingham Palace.

March 29—The President tells reporters that higher tariffs on carpets and sheet glass are mandatory because of domestic unemployment.

Mrs. Kennedy returns to Washington after a three week trip overseas.

Government

March 1—The President asks Congress to authorize the expansion of federal recreation areas with a program of \$1 billion over an 8-year period.

March 2—The President reveals he has ordered a series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere late in April unless a treaty ban is negotiated with the U.S.S.R. before the testing date.

March 9—The Department of Labor sets minimum wage rates for migratory Mexican labor in 22 states; rates range from 60 cents to \$1.00 hourly.

March 13—The President asks for \$4,878,500,000 in economic and military foreign aid appropriations for fiscal 1963.

The President signs the bill raising the federal debt limit temporarily to \$300 billion.

March 15—The President asks Congress to cooperate in a new program for consumer protection in the fields of drugs, food, cosmetics and television sets.

Congress sends an act to the White House strengthening a law to supervise individual welfare and pension plans.

The President signs legislation providing training in new skills for up to one million unemployed workers.

March 19—The U.S. sues the Communist party of the U.S. and four of its officials for \$500,000 in income taxes and interest for 1951.

March 24—In California, President Kennedy calls on former President Dwight D. Eisenhower for almost an hour-long visit.

March 26—The President asks Congress to enact a \$600 million public works program in some 958 depressed areas over an 18 month period.

March 28—The President tells Congress that unnecessary Government spending abroad must be further reduced to end the balance of payments deficit.

March 29—Charles Evans Whittaker retires from the Supreme Court because physical exhaustion is endangering his health.

March 30—Deputy Attorney General Byron R. White is named Associate Justice of the Supreme Court by President Kennedy.

Labor

March 9—New York City's Fifth Avenue Coach Lines sue the Transport Workers Union and Michael Quill, its president, for breach of contracts in the current bus strike that began March 1.

March 23—Limited bus service is resumed in New York City under the auspices of the city's Transit Authority. New York City took over the lines March 21.

March 26—A 12-day strike at 11 plants of Sperry Gyroscope ends.

March 28—A tentative steel settlement is reached on basic terms for a new 2-year contract covering 450,000 steel workers. No wage increase is provided but fringe benefits are said to total some 10 cents an hour. Wage negotiations are reportedly provided for after one year.

March 31—Formal agreement between the United Steelworkers and the steel industry is announced; President Kennedy says the terms of the new contract are "obviously noninflationary."

Military Policy

March 5—A B-58 jet bomber flies from Los Angeles to New York and back in a record 4 hours, 42 minutes.

March 7—A "solar observatory satellite," "Oso," goes into orbit.

March 8—The Atomic Energy Commission reveals that its twenty-first underground nuclear test has been completed.

March 16—A Titan 2 Rocket hits a target 5,000 miles from its launching site on its first flight.

March 21—In a compromise reached by the

President and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Vinson, the House Committee withdraws its insistence that the B-70 bomber must be developed; the President and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara agree to review the issue.

March 27—The White House reaffirms the U.S. policy that nuclear arms may be used by the U.S. if the U.S.S.R. launches a non-nuclear attack in Europe.

March 31—The Department of Defense reveals that 98 defense facilities are being closed or declared surplus.

Segregation

March 5—The Supreme Court of Appeals of the state of Virginia rules that there is no legal obligation under state law for Prince Edward County to reopen public schools.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People brings suit against Orange, New Jersey, on behalf of 18 Negro children and "thousands of Negro minors" who are being discriminated against because of "the fact of racial segregation in the public schools, whether with or without design."

March 27—Segregation is ordered ended in all Roman Catholic schools in the New Orleans Archdiocese, by the Archbishop of New Orleans.

Supreme Court

(See also U.S. Govt. March 29, 30)

March 5—The Court rules that owners of property near airports must be compensated for the nuisance of low-flying planes; low flights can make property so useless that in effect the property has been taken for public use.

The Court rules 8 to 1 that a union surrenders its right to strike when it agrees to arbitrate differences with management.

March 19—The Court rules 7 to 1 that an acquittal in a federal criminal case may not be set aside by a higher court even if the decision is erroneous; to retry a person puts him in double jeopardy.

March 26—The Court orders a restaurant at Memphis, Tennessee's municipal airport to desegregate.

The Court holds that federal courts

have the power and the duty to check on the constitutionality of the distribution of seats in state legislatures.

March 29—The President asks state legislatures to adjust inequities in voter representation in line with the Supreme Court decision of March 26.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

March 8—Sixteen U.S. army helicopters transport South Vietnamese soldiers to Cai Ngai, a Viet Cong (pro-Communist guerrillas) stronghold, which is easily captured.

March 17—The Soviet Union demands that the U.S. withdraw from South Vietnam; it charges that the U.S. is carrying on an "undeclared war" there. The Soviet Union was co-chairman, with Britain, of the 1954 Geneva conference ending the Indochina war.

March 24—*The New York Times* reports that without Congressional authorization, the U.S. in Vietnam is aiding a 1,200-man irregular force under a Chinese Roman Catholic priest, Rev. Ngu-yen Lac Hoa. The irregulars are known as sea swallows and operate at the tip of Vietnam at the Camau peninsula.

March 26—It is disclosed that on March 22 Vietnam troops began "Operation Sunrise," to eliminate Viet Cong guerrillas permanently. The first step of the drive began in Binh Duong Province; the drive provides for a threefold program: the ouster of the Viet Cong, establishment of government services in the cleared out areas by civil action cadres, and the continuation of regular government services after the cadres depart. The U.S. mission will help pay for this program.

March 28—It is reported that as part of Operation Sunrise, Americans and Vietnamese are trying to persuade rural Vietnamese to resettle in new villages to segregate them from Viet Cong guerrillas.

YUGOSLAVIA

March 13—The Yugoslav parliament approves an amnesty bill for certain Yugoslav exiles. Some 150,000 exiles and 1,000 prisoners are involved.

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